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I. INTRODUCTION

It is likely that many, if not most, employees in the United States are
unfamiliar with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), despite the
ubiquitous use of computers in the workplace.1 The CFAA is a federal
criminal statute, implemented to prosecute computer hacking at a time far
removed from today’s technological landscape.2 Currently one of the
broadest criminal laws in the United States Code, the CFAA potentially
affects anyone who uses a computer.3 Despite the statute’s criminal stature,
employers are increasingly using its civil provision to haul disloyal
employees into federal court.4
A typical employer CFAA cause of action alleges that an employee
obtained information by accessing a computer either without authorization or
in a manner that exceeded the employee’s authorized access.5 Whether the
1

Sarah Boyer, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Abusing Federal Jurisdiction, 6
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 661, 664 (2009) (describing how the nature of business has
changed significantly over the past twenty-five years as a result of technological advances).
2
See infra Part II.A (detailing the initial enactment of the CFAA).
3
Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010) (describing how amendments to the CFAA potentially
regulate use of every computer in the United States and millions abroad).
4
Michael D. Scott, SCOTT ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW, § 17.12 (3d ed.
2012) (describing how employers are increasingly pursuing claims under the CFAA against
employees who use company computers for personal reasons); see also Lee v. PMSI, Inc., No.
8:10 CV 2904 T 23TBM, 2011 WL 1742028, at *1, *3 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2011) (dismissing a
counterclaim by employer who alleged CFAA violation for employee’s use of Facebook on
company computer); see also Clarity Servs., Inc. v. Barney, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1316
(M.D. Fla. 2010) (expressing skepticism that an employee violates the CFAA simply by
checking personal e-mail at work).
5
Molly Eichten, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act–A Survey of Recent Cases,
66 BUS. LAW 231, 232 (2010). The typical employer CFAA claim involves an employee who
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CFAA is limited to hacking or extends to employees who misuse company
computers hinges entirely on how a court interprets the terms “without
authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.”6 Applying the CFAA to this
common situation has resulted in a split of authority as courts struggle with
the definition of “authorization.”7
Some courts construe the term “authorization” narrowly.8 An
employee’s misuse or misappropriation of the employer’s business
information is not “without authorization” as long as the employer gave the
employee permission to access the information.9 Once an employee is
granted authorization to access an employer’s computers, the CFAA is not
violated despite subsequent misuse of the information.10 Other courts
construe the term broadly, recognizing an employer’s cause of action when
an employee obtains business information with disloyal intent or in breach of
an agreement.11
The CFAA’s vast reach, along with commonplace use of computers
in business, makes it critical to clearly define the statute’s scope.12
Unfortunately, the divisive split brings more questions than clarity and
allows the CFAA to be used in unprecedented ways.13 With the Supreme
Court’s recent dismissal of a certiorari petition on the issue and
Congressional efforts focused elsewhere, courts are faced with the
responsibility of clearly and accurately interpreting the CFAA.14
obtains confidential or proprietary information from the employer’s computer system while
still employed but subsequently leaves the company. Id. at 232–33. The employee then uses
information to the employer’s detriment, often in direct competition with the employer. When
discovered, employers bring claims against the employee under the CFAA, often with state
tort claims for breach of contract.
6
Id. at 231.
7
Ajuba Intl. LLC v. Saharia, 871 F. Supp. 2d 671, 685–87 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(detailing the current circuit split of authority regarding whether the CFAA applies in
employer-employee situations).
8
LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
an employee acts without authorization when he has no permission to access computers at all
or such permission is rescinded).
9
Id.
10
Ajuba, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 687.
11
See Int’l Airport Ctr., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); EF Cultural
Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001) (identifying agency-based
interpretation in Citrin and a contract-based interpretation in Explorica).
12
Paul J. Larkin, Jr., United States v. Nosal: Rebooting the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 8 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 257, 261 (2012) (lamenting the need for more
specificity in determining which actions create liability under the CFAA as the CFAA can be
used in unprecedented ways not intended by Congress).
13
Id.
14
WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012),
cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831; see also Alan W. Nicgorski, Employees Exceeding Authorized
Access? Trends in Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 30 No. 18 WESTLAW J.
COMPUTER & INTERNET 1 (2013) (describing how a recent spark in Congressional efforts to
amend the CFAA has seemingly stalled); see also Sebastian E. Kaplan, The Rise of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Case, 17. No. 4 CYBERSPACE LAW 14, 14 (2012) (explaining
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This Comment contends that broad interpretations of the CFAA
implicate constitutional vagueness and overbreadth concerns, are
inconsistent with the underlying policy of the statute, and result in
inappropriate federal jurisdiction for traditional state law claims.15 Only a
narrow interpretation of the CFAA keeps the statute constitutional and
fulfills Congress’s original and primary intent to punish criminal computer
hackers and people who abuse legitimate access privileges.16
Part II of this Comment examines the history and legislative intent
behind the CFAA, focusing on the types of crime Congress targeted and the
balance Congress intended to strike by not preempting the field of computer
crimes.17 Part II also traces the important amendments throughout the
statute’s relatively short history and details current actions under the
CFAA.18 Part III explores several relevant doctrines and canons of statutory
construction that courts should consider when interpreting the CFAA.19
Part IV discusses the current circuit split, summarizing the
development and rationale behind each theory.20 It examines how each
theory handles “authorization,” and how employers fare when presenting
misappropriation claims.21 Part V contends that broad interpretations of the
CFAA do not meet constitutional requirements under the void for vagueness
doctrine or the doctrine of overbreadth.22 Moreover, courts applying a broad
interpretation of the CFAA shirk their duty to effectuate Congressional intent
by avoiding established canons of statutory construction and demolish
Congress’s intended scope by trampling existing state laws.23 In addition to
enumerating the deficiencies of broad interpretations, Part V also outlines
how a narrow interpretation’s restrained reading of the statutory language
complies with relevant doctrines, follows canons of construction, and

current Congressional proposals include Senator Leahy’s revision to limit liability to
exceeding authorized access to seven categories of sensitive information, and Senators
Grassley and Franken’s proposal to carve out an exception to the statute for violating terms of
service agreements).
15
See infra Part V (arguing why the CFAA requires a narrow interpretation).
16
See infra Parts IV–V (concluding that a narrow interpretation comports with
the intent of the CFAA and canons of construction).
17
See infra Part II.A–D (outlining why the CFAA was enacted, discussing the
exact type of crime and scope that Congress intended for the CFAA to cover).
18
See infra Part II.E–F (describing amendments of the CFAA and current
actions).
19
See infra Part III (outlining various doctrines and canons of statutory
construction).
20
See infra Part IV (detailing the current circuit split).
21
See infra Part IV (describing the effect of each theory).
22
See infra Part V.A–B (contending that agency and contract-based
interpretations of the CFAA do not provide the required notice to meet due process concerns,
and leave the CFAA vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement and overbreadth concerns).
23
See infra Part V.C–E (describing the deficiencies of broad interpretations
through their noncompliance with doctrines, canons of statutory construction, and avoidance
of Congressional intent).
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effectuates Congressional intent.24 This Comment concludes that the only
way to keep the CFAA constitutional is for courts to interpret it narrowly;
any other interpretation undermines the purpose and scope of the statute
while raising constitutional concerns.25
II. BACKGROUND
Although computer crime statutes exist in all fifty states and on the
federal level today, they remain a relatively new concept.26 The Counterfeit
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, more commonly
referred to as the CFAA, was enacted in 1984 and is the primary federal
statute used to combat computer crime.27 The CFAA criminalizes accessing a
computer without authorization or accessing a computer by exceeding the
authorization given.28 Originally narrow in scope and aimed at criminal
hackers, rapidly advancing technology and expansive amendments exploded
the CFAA’s use, transforming it into one of the most far-reaching criminal
statutes in the United States Code.29 A surge in the number of CFAA claims
brought by employers against disloyal employees followed a 1996 update to
the definition of “protected computers.”30 Consequently, a majority of the
law addressing the meaning and scope of the CFAA developed within the
context of employment disputes.31 Despite numerous amendments and
24

See infra Part V (demonstrating the benefits of narrowly interpreting the

CFAA).

25
See infra Parts V–VI (explaining how a narrow interpretation is the only way to
keep the CFAA constitutional and to effectuate the legislative intent).
26
Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization”
in Computer Misuse Statute, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1615 (2003) (noting that Florida was
the first state to pass a computer crime statute in 1978, and Vermont was the last state to pass
its version of a computer crime statute in 1999. Congress passed the first federal statute in
1984).
27
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, PUB.
L. NO. 98-473, § 2102(a); § 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92. Initially enacted in 1984, § 1030 became
known as the CFAA with the 1986 amendments; see also S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996)
(“[a]s intended when the law was originally enacted, the Computer Fraud and Abuse statute
facilitates addressing in a single statute the problem of computer crime, rather than identifying
and amending every potentially applicable statute affected by advances in computer
technology.”).
28
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c); Ajuba, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
29
See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, at 2 (2007)
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf. The CFAA has
been amended multiple times as Congress attempts to keep pace with changes in technology.
Initially enacted in 1984, subsequent amendments followed in 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994,
1996, 2001, 2002, and 2008. Id. See also Kaplan, supra note 14, at 14 (tallying a 600%
increase in complaints alleging a cause of action under the CFAA since 2002).
30
Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass, and Privacy,
62 BUS. LAW 1395, 1408 (2007). After the CFAA’s 1996 amendments, the number of civil
cases quickly eclipsed the number of criminal cases prosecuted. Id.
31
United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 456–57 (C.D. Cal 2009) (explaining
that a majority of CFAA case law has been developed in the context of civil cases).
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repeated use of the term throughout the statute, “without authorization”
remains undefined.32 A predicate for liability under the CFAA, this
undefined term has led to a three-way split of authority concerning the
proper interpretation of the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds
authorized access.”33
A. The Need for a Computer Crime Statute Becomes Obvious
Understanding the problem Congress faced and identifying the type
of behavior Congress intended to target through the CFAA is critical to
defining the statute’s proper scope.34 Subdividing computer crimes into two
categories—traditional crimes committed using computers, and crimes of
computer misuse—helps demonstrate the specific type of crime the CFAA
was enacted to target.35 Congress’s aim in enacting the CFAA was
specifically to deter and combat only crimes of computer misuse.36
Traditional crimes using computers involve the online commission
or facilitation of traditional criminal offenses that ordinarily do not include a
computer.37 The elements of such crimes are not affected by the use of a
computer and remain susceptible to federal prosecution under existing
criminal statutes.38 For example, a death threat is still a death threat whether
sent through email or postal mail; the involvement of a computer does not
affect the ability to prosecute the crime.39 These traditional crimes using
32

See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006); see also S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 13 (1986)
(“without authorization” contained in § 1030(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5)(A), (5)(B), (5)(C), (6), and
(7)(B) was not defined because Congress thought it was “self-explanatory”).
33
Ajuba, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 686 (describing the current split of authority
concerning the proper interpretation of “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized
access” before ultimately deciding that the narrow interpretation is the better approach).
34
Kerr, supra note 26, at 1602. Computer crime statutes were a response to
perceived failures of preexisting laws to respond to crimes of computer misuse. Amendments
to the CFAA were enacted to address changes in computer technology, “particularly new
computer abuse techniques such as computer viruses and worms, which make prosecutions
difficult in some types of cases.” Id. See also S. REP. NO. 101-544 (1990).
35
See Kerr, supra note 26, at 1602–05. Scholar Orin Kerr’s categorical approach
to computer crimes helps clearly delineate Congress’s targeted crimes.
36
S. REP. NO. 101-544 (1990).
Overall, existing criminal statutes provide an adequate framework for the
prosecution of most types of computer-related criminal conduct. Existing fraud,
embezzlement, theft, and destruction of property statutes can be used to punish
those who commit these types of offenses with the assistance of a computer.
However, as computer criminals become more sophisticated, using viruses, worms
and other types of computer software and hardware to commit heretofore
unanticipated offenses, the criminal code must be readjusted to keep up with these
developments.
Id.
37
Kerr, supra note 26, at 1602–03.
38
Id. Examples of traditional crimes committed using computers include internet
fraud schemes, online distribution of child pornography, and cyberstalking.
39
Id.
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computers did not require new laws to protect against abuse at the state level
either, since a hallmark of federalism placed these issues squarely within
state police powers.40
Computer misuse crimes, on the other hand, represented a new type
of crime.41 Computer misuse crimes consist of conduct that intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes interference with the proper
functioning of computers and computer networks.42 Common computer
misuse crimes include hacking or distributing viruses.43 The government had
difficulty prosecuting computer misuse crimes under traditional criminal
statutes like trespass, burglary, and theft because the elements of traditional
crimes tie closely to the physical world, while the elements of computer
misuse crimes do not.44 For example, a computer hacker can illicitly steal a
computer program without physically trespassing or depriving the owner of
possession.45 Even though the hacker has committed a wrongful act,
prosecution under traditional trespass, burglary or theft statutes would be
difficult because elements such as the defendant’s physical intrusion onto the
owner’s property, or the defendant physically depriving the owner of his
property, are not met.46 The CFAA was created to protect people and
property against only these new computer misuse crimes by filling in gaps
where existing crime statutes could not account for the unique problem posed
by computer data.47
40
Id.; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 66 (2005) (referencing the state’s
“traditional police powers to define the criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of their citizens”); see also Advanced Aerofoil Techs., AG v. Todaro, No. 11 Civ
9505, 2013 WL 410873 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013) (dismissing an employer’s CFAA
claim alleging misuse of company information, but noting that employer may still have
remedies available to it under state and common law).
41
H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984) as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689,
3695 (“[i]t is obvious that traditional theft/larceny statutes are not the proper vehicle to control
the spate of computer abuse and computer assisted crimes.”).
42
Kerr, supra note 26, at 1603–04. This type of conduct misuses and violates the
rights and privileges that the computer or account owner expects to have over their computer
or account. Id.
43
Id.
44
Kerr, supra note 26, at 1605–11. For example, traditional trespass and burglary
require the defendant to physically trespass on someone else’s property, and deprive the
rightful owner of physical possession. The limited scope is difficult to apply to computer
misuse because the user doesn’t physically enter another’s property, or physically
misappropriate a tangible thing. Even when courts identified a computer as a property interest,
it became difficult to explain how computer misuse actually deprived the owner of that
property.
45
Id.
46
Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984) (explaining why computer
misuse crimes did not fit well into categories of property subject to abuse or theft).
47
Garrett D. Urban, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of
Current Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1369, 1388–89 (2011). Congress’s intent was for the
CFAA to target new forms of computer crimes not currently addressed by federal or state
criminal statutes. Despite technological advances, using computers to carry out traditional
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B. The Initial Enactment of the CFAA in 1984
Computer crime statutes did not exist when computer misuse became
a cognizable problem in the 1970s.48 The federal government responded to
these new crimes by enacting the first computer-crime statute as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.49 Consciously narrow in scope
and aimed at hackers, the statute was limited to protecting classified
information, financial records, and credit information stored on computers
owned by the government and financial institutions.50
Unfortunately, the concentrated scope of the 1984 statute drew
immediate criticism from legislatures, industry leaders, and law enforcement
officials.51 The limiting language in the original version was so narrowly
drawn that the statute could not be effectively used.52 The statute’s
ineffectiveness coupled with the increasing use of computers in public and
private sectors led to significant changes in 1986.53

crimes did not require new laws, and had always been implemented and enforced by states as
part of their police powers.
48
Katherine Mesenbring Field, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining
Employees’ Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819,
835 (2009) (detailing the legislative history and concluding that the CFAA seeks to capture
crimes of computer misuse rather than traditional offenses using a computer).
49
H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984). “It is noteworthy that section 1030 deals
with an ‘unauthorized access’ concept of computer fraud rather than the mere use of a
computer.” The conduct prohibited in the CFAA is analogous to breaking and entering rather
than using a computer (similar to the use of a gun) in committing a crime. Specifically, the
CFAA targets crimes where the computer is the victim and not crimes that simply use a
computer to commit another traditional crime. See also Charles Doyle, Cybercrime: An
Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal
Laws, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 Dec. 27, 2010 at 1 (describing the CFAA as,
“not a comprehensive provision, but instead it fills cracks and gaps in the protection afforded
by other federal criminal laws.”).
50
Id. Legislators considered and rejected a broader scope, concentrating instead
only on the most vital federal interests. See Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986: A Measured Response to A Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 455–56
(1990).
51
Frank P. Andreano, The Evolution of Federal Computer Crime Policy: The Ad
Hoc Approach to An Ever-Changing Problem, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81, 86 (1999); see also
Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030), 174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 at 1 (2001); see Griffith, supra note
50, at 485 (noting the widespread dissatisfaction with the original statute. Described as both
“overly vague and too narrow in scope,” prosecution proved difficult under the statute which
decreased its deterrent value).
52
S. REP. No. 99-432, at 6 (1986). The original statute limited the information
protected by referencing the Right to Financial Privacy Act. Recognizing that important
financial information existed outside the scope of this narrow Act, Congress extended the
protection to financial records of all customers of financial institutions.
53
See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3-4 (1986); see also Griffith, supra note 50, at 483.
The 1986 amendments were necessary to broaden protection to cover private sector computers
and facilitate federal prosecution of computer-related crimes.
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C. The 1986 Amendments: The CFAA is Born
The extensive 1986 amendments gave the statute its current name:
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).54 Congress expanded the
statute’s scope by modifying existing crimes, adding new offenses, changing
intent requirements, and adding definitions.55 Despite the statute’s increased
scope, its premise remained the same and Congress kept the CFAA’s
jurisdiction limited to crimes involving a compelling federal interest.56
Congress made several changes to remove accidental access and the
use of legitimately obtained information from the CFAA’s scope.57
Additionally, Congress added a subsection to define key terms and expand
the definition of “federal interest computer.”58 The CFAA initially applied to
a person who either (1) knowingly accessed without authorization, or (2)
“having accessed a computer with authorization, use[d] the opportunity such
access provide[d] for purposes to which such authorization [did] not
extend.”59 Congress replaced the latter phrase with the defined term “exceeds
authorized access.”60 The term “exceeds authorized access” is defined as “to
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or
alter.”61 Further, “exceeds authorized access” remains an element in multiple
54

See supra note 27.
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3–4 (1986).
56
Buckman, supra note 51, at 1 (limiting the CFAA’s jurisdictions to cases
involving a compelling federal interest). See also S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3–4 (1986) (“The
premise . . . will remain the protection, for privacy reasons, of computerized credit records and
computerized information relating to customers’ relationships with financial institutions. This
protection is imperative in light of the sensitive and personal financial information contained
in such computer files.”).
57
Griffith, supra note 50, at 463 (changing the language to ensure that the
provision would not be construed to prohibit computer access for legitimate business
purposes, the Senate report stated the sole purpose of subsection (a)(2) was to “deter hackers
and other criminals from accessing computerized financial files without authorization.”).
58
Andreano, supra note 51, at 86–87; 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1987)
(expanding the definition of a “federal interest” computer to cover crimes committed using
computers in more than one state).
59
PUB. L. NO. 98-473 § 2102, 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–91 (1984).
60
See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 21 (1986) (stating the reason for the amendment was
to eliminate coverage for authorized access used for improper purpose).
This removes from the sweep of the statute one of the murkier grounds of
liability, under which a Federal employee's access to computerized data
might be legitimate in some circumstances, but criminal in other (not
clearly distinguishable) circumstances that might be held to exceed his
authorization. As the committee report points out, administrative sanctions
should ordinarily be adequate to deal with real abuses of authorized
access.
Id.
61
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6); see also Walsh Bishop Assocs., Inc. v. O’Brien,
No. 11-2673, 2012 WL 669069 at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 28, 2012) (concluding that the reason for
the amendment was to remove use as a basis for exceeding authorization).
55
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CFAA provisions.62 Even though Congress included definitions for several
key terms, “without authorization” remains undefined.63
Primarily designed to punish and deter the theft of information from
outside hackers, legislative history affirms that Congress always intended for
the CFAA to apply to insiders who intentionally damaged protected
computers.64 This distinction is expressed in the statutory language: outsiders
would be “without authorization” while insiders would “exceed authorized
access.”65 Outside intruders accessing a protected computer “without
authorization” faced criminal liability for any intentional, reckless, or even
negligent, damage caused by their trespass.66 Congress raised the intent
standard from “knowingly” to “intentionally” in several subsections to
emphasize that “intentional acts of unauthorized access—rather than
mistaken, inadvertent, or careless ones—are precisely what the Committee
intends to proscribe.”67
62

Andreano, supra note 51, at 87.
See supra note 32.
64
See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984). The original House Report supporting
passage of the first CFAA cited to two cases to illustrate the need for a computer crime
statute; both involved unauthorized access by former employees. This indicates Congress was
not solely focused on deterring hackers when passing the original CFAA statute; See also S.
REP. NO. 104-357, at 9 (1996) (“[t]he law currently protects computers or computer systems
from damage caused by either outside hackers or malicious insiders. . .’”).
65
S. REP. NO. 99-432 (1986) (Congress distinguishes between the terms “without
authorization” and “exceeds authorized access,” using the first to apply to outside hackers, and
the second applicable only to insiders, i.e. people within a company). A clear example is the
amended § 1030(a)(3) which contains the term “unauthorized access” but not “exceeds
authorized access.” Congress removed “exceeds authorized access” to “preclude liability in
purely ‘insider’ cases.” See also Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 913 n.16 (2003)
(describing an outsider as anyone who intrudes on a computer from outside the organization,
as opposed to an insider who exceeds their authorized access by viewing sensitive data or
entering into a restricted computer); see also S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 8–11 (1996) (detailing
the sentencing scheme for the CFAA and the rationale for why insiders and outsiders are
treated differently).
66
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 5–6 (1986) (explaining that unsure of evolving
technology, Congress changed the intent standard to “intentionally” in order to exclude
individuals who “inadvertently ‘stumble[d] into’ someone else’s computer file or computer
data,” especially where such individual was authorized to use a particular computer”); S. REP.
NO. 104-357, at 11 (1996) (“[i]nsiders . . . authorized to access a computer, face criminal
liability only if they intend to cause damage to the computer, not for recklessly or negligently
causing damage. By contrast, outside hackers who break into a computer could be punished
for any intentional, reckless, or other damage they cause by their trespass.”).
67
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 7 (1986). Further focusing the scope, the Senate Report
clarified that the statute was not meant to cover employees’ authorized to access computers
that acted in a way that, although wrong, did not rise to the level of criminal conduct.
It is not difficult to envision an employee . . . who, while authorized to use
a particular computer in one department, briefly exceeds his authorized
access and peruses data belonging to the department that he is not
supposed to look at. This is especially true where the department in
question lacks a clear method of delineating which individuals are
authorized to access certain of its data. The Committee believes that
63
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D. Congress’s Careful Balance Between State and Federal Statutes
Senate reports contain clear evidence that despite widening the scope
of the CFAA in 1986, Congress did not intend for the amendments to
preempt the entire field of computer crime or to make every offense
involving a computer a crime under the Act.68 Although states had not
uniformly addressed the still-emerging issue of computer crimes, forty-seven
states had enacted specific computer crime statutes by 1986.69 Congress
rejected proposals to make the statute so sweeping that “no computer crime
is potentially uncovered,” and decided a more appropriate balance would be
to limit the CFAA to crimes concerning a compelling federal interest or
crimes interstate in nature.70 Congress intentionally left room for states to be
undisturbed by the moderate reach of the CFAA and able to develop their
own solutions to the burgeoning issue.71
E. The Civil Provision and Expanded Definitions Continue to Broaden the
CFAA’s Scope
Congress added the private cause of action to the felony provisions
of the CFAA in 1994 to allow victims to recover damages for economic loss

administrative sanctions are more appropriate than criminal punishment in
such a case. The Committee wishes to avoid the danger that every time an
employee exceeds his authorized access to his department’s computers—
no matter how slightly—he could be prosecuted.
Id.

68
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4 (1986). “Throughout its consideration of computer
crime, the Committee has been especially concerned about the appropriate scope of Federal
jurisdiction in this area.” Id.
69
Id.; see Griffith, supra note 50, at 485 (describing why Congress chose not to
preempt a significant body of law by limiting the scope of the CFAA to compelling federal
interest).
70
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4; see Griffith, supra note 50, at 484 (acknowledging
“the Judiciary Committee’s long-standing policy of limiting federal crimes to matters of
compelling federal interest or to criminal acts that state or local governments were incapable
of handling.”).
71
Griffith, supra note 50, at 484; see also S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4 (1986).
It has been suggested that, because some States lack comprehensive
computer crime statutes of their own, the Congress should enact as
sweeping a Federal statute as possible so that no computer crime is
potentially uncovered. The Committee rejects this approach and prefers
instead to limit Federal jurisdiction over computer crime to those cases in
which there is a compelling federal interest, i.e., where computers of the
Federal Government or certain financial institutions are involved, or
where the crime itself is interstate in nature. The Committee is convinced
that this approach strikes the appropriate balance between the Federal
Government’s interest in computer crime and the interests and abilities of
the States to proscribe and punish such offenses.
Id.
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against wrongdoers as a civil remedy.72 Congressional records indicate that
the civil provision was a reaction to a dramatic rise in the number of
computer crime cases and the government’s inability to pursue all of these
claims.73 The civil remedy was designed to provide injured individuals with a
remedy and to increase the deterrent value of the statute.74 Employers
enthusiastically embraced this civil remedy as a way to recapture
compensatory damages or obtain injunctive relief against former
employees.75
Increasing national reliance on computer networks mixed with
concern over notorious and highly destructive reports of hacking led to
further expansions of the statute.76 Although the term “federal interest
computer” was replaced with “protected computer” in 1996, subsequent
amendments significantly broadened the term.77 Addressing the interstate
nature of computer networks, in 2008 Congress injected the phrase “affecting
interstate commerce” into the definition of “protected computer” to permit
jurisdiction as far as its Commerce Clause power allowed.78 Currently, any
72

See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, PUB. L. NO.
103-322 tit. XXIX § 290001, 108 Stat. 1796 Title XXIX 2097-99 (1994) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1030). The 1994 amendments were part of the larger Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. In addition to adding a civil provision, § 1030(g), other
amendments expanded the statute to apply to computer damage incurred accidentally and even
without negligence.
73
Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L.
REV. 320, 329 (2004); 146 Cong. Rec. S10, 916 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
74
S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 9 (1990) (introducing the civil provision as a remedy
that “would authorize private suits in an area that law enforcement has sometimes been
reluctant to investigate or prosecute. Deterrence is another goal.”).
75
See Winn, supra note 30 (explaining the increase in CFAA claims by
employers).
76
Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:
Two Problems and Two Solutions, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 453 (2009).
77
The USA Patriotic Act of 2001 expanded “protected computers” to include
computers outside the United States if involved in interstate or foreign commerce. The 2008
amendment, part of the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act, removed the
requirement of interstate communication, making any unauthorized access to any protected
computer that retrieves any kind of information (either interstate or intrastate) punishable
under the statute. A “protected computer” is any computer “which is used in . . . interstate or
foreign commerce or communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2012). This broad
definition encompasses nearly every computer since a connection to the internet satisfies this
requirement. See Daniel J. Winters & John F. Costello, Jr., The Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act: A new weapon in the trade secrets litigation arena, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Vol. 44,
No. 3 April 2005.
78
S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 9 (1990) (explaining that the Commerce Clause was an
appropriate addition to the CFAA due to “the interstate nature of computer networks, and the
ease with which computer abuse, such as destructive computer viruses or worms, can spread
across State lines”); see also United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007)
(explaining that computers’ connection to the internet rendered them part of a system
inexorably intertwined with interstate commerce and thus properly within the realm of
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computer or device capable of connecting to the internet is a “protected
computer” within the CFAA’s scope.79 Overall, the numerous amendments
and legislative history of the relatively young CFAA indicate a conscious
broadening of the CFAA in both scope and breadth.80 However, these
purposeful expansions are accurately attributed to Congress’s desire to
effectively prosecute serious interstate computer crimes in the face of
evolving technology rather than an intent to displace existing state laws or
preempt all computer crimes.81
F. Current Actions Triggering liability Under the CFAA
With all internet-accessible computers protected under the CFAA,
the current version of the statute provides criminal and civil liability when an
individual: (1) intentionally accesses a computer “without authorization” or
“exceeds authorized access,” and (2) engages in one of seven types of
prohibited conduct.82 The private, civil right of action is currently limited to
felony violations under the criminal law.83 A party bringing a private, civil
action must establish two essential elements: (1) a violation of one of the
seven proscribed activities resulting in damage or loss, and (2) a violation

Congress’s Commerce Clause power) (citing United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245
(3rd Cir. 2006)); see Buckman, supra note 51 (explaining, “since the advent of the Internet,
almost all computer use has become interstate in nature.”).
79
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2); see also Cont’l Group, Inc. v. KW Prop. Mgmt., LLC,
622 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“[a] connection to the internet is ‘affecting
interstate commerce or communication.’”).
80
Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond Wargames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act Should Be Interpreted In the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y
405, 415–16 (2012).
81
S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996). “As computers continue to proliferate in
businesses and homes, and new forms of computer crimes emerge, Congress must remain
vigilant to ensure that the Computer Fraud and Abuse statute is up-to-date and provides law
enforcement with the necessary legal framework to fight computer crime. [1996 amendments]
will likely not represent the last amendment to this statute, but is necessary and constructive
legislation to deal with the current increase in computer crime”; see also 139 Cong. Rec.
S16421-03, 1993 WL 490040 (“It is important to update our laws to stay abreast of rapid
changes in computer technology and computer abuse crimes”) (statement of Senator Leahy,
the sponsor of the bill). See also S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 11 (1990) (reporting that introducing
the civil provision was not expected to incur any significant cost to the federal government).
82
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(7) (2008); see Andrew T. Hernacki, A Vague Law in A
Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. Rev. 1543, 1551 (2012) (summarizing each of the current
subsections of the CFAA). The seven actions include: (1) obtaining national security
information, (2) compromising the confidentiality of a computer; (3) trespassing in a
Government computer; (4) accessing a computer to defraud and obtain value; (5) transmission
or access that causes damage; (6) trafficking in passwords; and (7) extortion involving threats
to damage computer). Id.
83
See Winn, supra note 30, at 1405.
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must involve one of five aggravating factors enumerated in the statute.84
Employers typically bring a civil action under the aggravating factor of
losses exceeding $5,000.85 The least demanding CFAA provision allows
liability for anyone who intentionally accesses and obtains information from
any protected computer without authorization or by exceeding authorized
accessed.86
Traditionally
employer-employee
and
company-consumer
relationships have been governed by tort and contract law, but employers are
finding the CFAA’s invitation to federal court an attractive lure.87 The
CFAA’s civil provision allows employers to charge both the former
employee and the former employee’s new company and permits injunctive
relief.88 The civil provision opens the door to federal jurisdiction while
supplemental jurisdiction permits the inevitable litany of accompanying state
law claims to be adjudicated as well.89
Employers are often able to find relief under a CFAA claim with a
much lower evidentiary standard compared with the same claim in state
84

18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). The aggravating factors are: (I) loss to one or more
persons during any one-year period aggregating at least $5000 in value; (II) the modification
or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical examination,
diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more individuals; (III) physical injury to any person;
(IV) a threat to public health or safety; and (V) damage affecting a computer used by or for an
entity of the United States government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national
defense, or national security. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V). Id.
85
Robert C. Kain, Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Employee Hacking
Legal in California and Virginia, but Illegal in Miami, Dallas, Chicago, and Boston, 87 FLA.
B.J. 36, 38 (2013) (listing all the civil liabilities, but noting the typical basis for civil action).
86
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Because a “protected computer” is any computer
with internet access, and “obtain” includes merely viewing information, any person who
intentionally views information on a computer can potentially incur liability depending on
how the court interprets authorization. See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6 (1986) (clarifying that
“obtain” includes viewing information, and does not require any downloading or copying); see
also United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125–26 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that each of
the statute’s seven subsection addresses a different type of harm, and rejecting defendant’s
contention that § 1030(a)(2)(C) required anything more than intention to access a protected
computer without authorization or by exceeding authorized use in order to obtain
information).
87
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing
employment dispute as an area traditionally governed by tort and contract law); see also
Thomas E. Booms, Hacking into Federal Court: Employee “Authorization” Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 551 (2011). Examples of
commonly ancillary state law claims include tortious interference with business relations, theft
of trade secrets, breach of employment contracts, or breach of fiduciary duty.
88
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a), (g).
89
Id.; see Brenton, supra note 76, at 451. The supplemental jurisdiction statute
states that once a plaintiff gains access to federal court through federal question jurisdiction,
as they would if stating a claim under the federal CFAA statute, they are able to ask the
federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that form “part of the
same case or controversy” as the plaintiff’s federal claim. In a CFAA claim the same allegedly
wrongful act will frequently give rise to all claims allowing the plaintiff’s state law claims to
satisfy the initial supplemental jurisdiction requirements. Id.
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court.90 Trade secret litigation provides an excellent example of how policydriven balancing tests meted out in state courts are easily avoided through a
CFAA claim.91 Prevailing under a state court trade secret claim typically
requires the employer to prove that (1) the inappropriately accessed
information was a legally protected trade secret, (2) the employer took steps
to protect the information’s secrecy, and (3) the departing employee
misappropriated the information.92 In contrast, a CFAA claim automatically
protects any information accessed through a computer, making it much easier
for employers to successfully recover.93 Recovering under broad
interpretations of the CFAA is possible once an employer proves that an
employee accessed a computer without authorization and demonstrates the
necessary damages.94
III. RELEVANT DOCTRINES AND CANONS OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
Doctrines and canons of statutory construction exist to ensure the
constitutionality of statutes and to help courts effectuate legislative intent.95
Constitutional guarantees to due process of law drive the void for vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines by demanding that laws provide fair notice and do

90

See Booms, supra note 87, at 550–51 (comparing the elements necessary to
prove a trade secret claim under state law; CFAA claims do not require proof that the
misappropriated data was a trade secret, just that the information came from a protected
computer); see also Economic Espionage Act of 1996 18 U.S.C. § § 1831-39 (2006) PL 112269, January 14, 2013, 126 Stat. 2442. The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) was enacted in
1996 and is the federal statute that addresses trade secret theft. The EEA largely tracks the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (most state statutes modeled after this as well). There is no private
right of action under the EEA. See Cooper Square Realty Inc. v. Jensen, 04-CIV.01011
(CSH), 2005 WL 53284 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2005) (“[C]ongressional intent . . . expressly
and unambiguously demonstrates that Congress did not establish a private cause of action in
the EEA”).
91
See Winters, supra note 77 (describing the strategic benefits of bringing a trade
secret claim under the CFAA in order to sidestep obstacles and limitations imposed under the
Illinois Trade Secret Act).
92
Graham M. Liccardi, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for
Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155, 158–59
(2008). Forty-seven states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) or some
variation thereof, as the basis for its trade secret misappropriation cause of action. Id.
93
Greg Pollaro, Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:
Narrowing the Scope, DUKE L. & TECH. REV.12, 22 (2010).
94
See Brenton, supra note 76, at 448–49. To be protected under a trade secret
statute, information must be kept secret. Trade secret statutes’ heightened evidentiary
standards reflect careful balancing between safeguarding business information and
guaranteeing employee mobility. In contrast, any information accessible through a computer
may be protected under the CFAA. Id.
95
Yule Kim, Cong. Research Serv., 97-589, Statutory Interpretation: General
Principles and Recent Trends, at 3 (2008).
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not significantly curtail protected activities.96 The doctrine of constitutional
doubt requires courts to avoid constructions that pose difficult constitutional
questions and to construe statutes constitutionally whenever possible.97 If a
statute is susceptible to two different meanings—one constitutional and one
unconstitutional— courts must choose the constitutional definition to save
the statute.98
In addition to doctrines, courts frequently rely on canons of statutory
construction to draw inferences about the meaning of statutory language.99
The overriding objective of statutory construction is to effectuate
Congressional purpose.100 Even if the interpretive question involves only a
provision of a larger statute, a court’s duty is to construe the entire statute
sensibly.101 Briefly describing applicable doctrines and canons of statutory
construction are necessary to appreciate why the CFAA must be narrowly
interpreted.102
A. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine
The void for vagueness doctrine, rooted in the Due Process Clause,
insists that criminal statutes: (1) provide notice to the public of what
behavior is prohibited, and (2) include meaningful standards to prevent
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.103 The first prong of the void for
96
See United States. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292–306 (2008) (describing the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines).
97
Almendarez-Torrez v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1998) (explaining
that this canon is followed out of respect for Congress, which the court assumes “legislates in
the light of constitutional limitations”); see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001)
(“[i]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, and where an alternate interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible’…we are
obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems.”).
98
Almendarez-Torrez, 523 U.S. at 238; see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331
(1988) (“[t]he federal courts have the duty to avoid constitutional difficulties by doing so if
such a [narrowing] construction is fairly possible”); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 149 (2007) (explaining the canon of constitutional avoidance as, “[an] elementary rule . .
. every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality.”).
99
Kim, supra note 95, at 3.
100
See United States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that courts interpret statutes to give effect to the intent of Congress); see Kim, supra note 95,
at 3.
101
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 568 (1995) (explaining the court’s duty
to construe statutes, not isolated provisions).
102
Chicksaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001). Canons of statutory
construction are not mandatory rules. They are guidelines designed to help courts determine
Congressional intent. If other circumstances or evidence can strongly prove congressional
intent, canons may be overcome. Additionally, some canons champion maxims that are
incompatible with other canons, forcing a court to pick one over another. Nonetheless, when
the language and legislative history is ambiguous, canons can provide guidance.
103
Kolander v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also Williams, 553 U.S. at
306 (“[w]hat renders a statute vague is . . . the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.
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vagueness doctrine, the fair notice requirement, ensures that ordinary citizens
can act in conformity with the law.104 A statute can violate due process rights
if citizens have to guess, or vary in their understanding of, a statute’s
meaning.105
The second prong of the void for vagueness doctrine focuses on how
much discretion the statute gives to the government officials enforcing it.106
A statute must direct law enforcement officials and triers of fact in a
predictable and equitable application of its provisions.107 A statute is
unconstitutionally vague if its lack of guidelines could result in arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement.108 For example, including a mens rea
requirement in a statute can alleviate vagueness concerns by narrowing the
scope of a statute and limiting prosecutorial discretion.109
A statute with language that is impermissibly vague can be saved
through a narrow judicial interpretation.110 Once a court interprets the
meaning of a statute, the judicial interpretation becomes part of the statute’s
meaning.111 The canon of constitutional avoidance directs a court to save a

Thus, we have struck down statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant’s
conduct was ‘annoying’ or ‘indecent’—wholly subjective judgments without statutory
definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.”).
104
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 58, n.14 (1999) (holding that an
ordinance’s definition of loiter, “to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose,” was
unconstitutionally vague because it drew no distinction between innocent conduct and conduct
calculated to cause harm); see F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317
(2012).
105
See Fox Television Studios, 132 S.Ct. at 2317 (“[a] fundamental principle in
our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of
conduct that is forbidden or required.”).
106
Kolander, 461 U.S. at 357.
107
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (holding that if
enforcement of a criminal statute can be done on an entirely subjective basis the statute is
impermissibly vague).
108
Kolander, 461 U.S. at 358; see Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572–73 (1974)
(describing the level of guidance necessary for a statute to be constitutional: it is within the
province of the legislature, and not law enforcement, to make law, and they must fashion
statute with enough guidance so that it is not left to the “personal predilections” of police or
prosecutors).
109
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 149–50 (concluding that the word “deliberate” in an
abortion statute helped alleviate vagueness concerns because by ensuring that doctors
performing abortions would not face criminal liability if they delivered a fetus beyond the
prohibited point in good faith).
110
Morales, 527 at 61, n.31 (distinguishing the instant case from Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 329–30 (1988), “[t]here, we noted that the text of the relevant statute, read
literally, may have been void for vagueness. . . [w]e then found, however, that the Court of
Appeals had ‘provided a narrowing construction that alleviates. . . these difficulties’”); but see
id. at 68–69 (if a federal court is interpreting a state statute, the federal court has no authority
to construe the language of a state statute more narrowly than the construction given by that
state’s highest court).
111
Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23 (1973) (“[w]hen a state statute has been
construed to forbid identifiable conduct so that ‘interpretation by (the state court) puts these
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statute from unconstitutionality through a narrow interpretation when faced
with the option of invalidating a statute due to vagueness or curing the
vagueness through narrow interpretation.112
B. The Overbreadth Doctrine
Closely related to the void for vagueness doctrine is the doctrine of
overbreadth.113 The overbreadth doctrine prohibits a criminal law from
sweeping so broadly that it also encompasses constitutionally protected
activity.114 A statute is overbroad if its language is so broad that sanctions
apply to conduct that the government is not entitled to regulate.115 If
impermissible applications are substantial when compared to the statute’s
legitimate scope, the overbreadth doctrine can invalidate entire statutes.116
Even statutes designed primarily to prohibit or target only criminal conduct
cannot survive an overbreadth challenge if a protected right is substantially
infringed.117
C. The Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity is a canon of statutory construction for criminal
statutes, but can also apply in civil contexts if the statute at issue has criminal
and noncriminal applications.118 This “junior version of the vagueness
doctrine” assures that citizens have fair notice by resolving any ambiguity in
a statute to only apply to clearly covered conduct.119 The rule of lenity
words in the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legislature,’ claims of
impermissible vagueness must be judged in that light.”).
112
Boos, 485 U.S. at 330–31(finding it “well settled” that federal courts have the
power to adopt narrowing constructions of federal legislation); see also Kerr, supra note 3, at
1573.
113
See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (striking down an overly-broad
Alabama statute against loitering or pickets outside a business).
114
Id. See also Galbraith, supra note 73, at 323 (noting that the contract-based
theory has “allowed website owners to utilize the CFAA to override the carefully balanced
provisions of the copyright laws and improperly restrict speech in violation of the First
Amendment.”).
115
Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
law is overbroad if it prohibits not only acts the legislature may forbid, but also
constitutionally protected conduct).
116
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615–16 (1973).
117
M. Katherine Boychuck, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or
Overbroad?, 88 NW. U.L. REV. 769, 773 (1994).
118
Id. Statutes with criminal and noncriminal applications still need to be
interpreted consistently; hence, the rule of lenity may be invoked even in a civil context.
Because the CFAA has both criminal and civil provisions, the rule of lenity may apply. See
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (interpreting a term narrowly despite arising in a
civil deportation case because, “we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we
encounter its application in a criminal or a noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”).
119
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 463; see Miller, 687 F.3d at 204 (rejecting plaintiff’s
argument in a civil CFAA claim for a broad interpretation by holding “in the interest of
providing fair warning of ‘what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed,’ we will
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embodies two important policies.120 First, citizens should be given fair
warning in easily understood language of behavior that can result in criminal
sanctions.121 Due process prevents courts from construing laws in novel or
surprising ways by criminalizing conduct not clearly defined in a statute.122
Second, laws with criminal penalties are a reflection of society’s
condemnation and should be defined by legislatures, not courts.123
Ambiguities in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant
to both afford notice and to ensure that the boundaries of criminal statutes are
sketched by legislatures and not courts.124 Before the rule of lenity applies, a
court must conclude that there is serious ambiguity or uncertainty in the
statute that normal methods of statutory construction cannot resolve.125
Courts narrowly interpreting the CFAA frequently cite to the rule of lenity as
a guiding principle.126
The instruction that ambiguity of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity interlocks with the presumption that Congress acts
interstitially.127 The balance between state and federal criminal jurisdiction
construe this criminal statute strictly and avoid interpretations not clearly warranted by the
text”); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 148 (1994) (finding that lenity
principles demand resolution of ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant); see
also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (determining that the touchstone for
notice is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at
the relevant time that the defendant’s conduct was criminal).
120
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971).
121
Id.
122
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 463; see also Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134 (applying the rule
of lenity to the CFAA because, “[t]he Supreme Court has long warned against interpreting
criminal statutes in surprising and novel ways that impose unexpected burdens on
defendants.”).
123
Bass, 404 U.S. at 347–48.
124
Id. at 348.
125
Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64–65 (1995). If courts are unable to deduce the
meaning of a statute after examining the statutory text and available legislative sources, then
the rule of lenity requires construing the statute in favor of the criminal defendant. See also
Clarity, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 1316 (explaining that because the CFAA is criminal in nature and
ambiguous, invoking the rule of lenity is appropriate and the rule favors the less harsh version
on the defendant); see also Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (D. Ariz.
2008) (discussing the principles of statutory construction, specifically the rule of lenity in
guiding the court’s interpretation of the CFAA because it has both criminal and noncriminal
applications).
126
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, 2006 WL 2683058 at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1,
2006) (finding that the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” were
ambiguous and required applying the rule of lenity to produce a restrained, narrow
interpretation); see also ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 612
(M.D. Tenn. 2010) (finding the CFAA unambiguous, but stating that even if the court found
the CFAA ambiguous, the rule of lenity would require any ambiguity to be resolved in favor
of the defendant); see also Dana Ltd. v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL 2524008
at *4 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012) (holding that because the CFAA is primarily a criminal
statute, the rule of lenity requires any ambiguity to be resolved in favor of the defendant).
127
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (explaining that before a court
chooses a harsher alternative, it should remember that unless Congress conveys its purpose
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requires Congress to convey its purpose clearly if it intends for a statute to
effect a significant change in the balance.128 Absent a clear Congressional
purpose, courts should not interpret statutes in ways that would significantly
change the federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes.129
D. The Plain Language Rule
The starting point in statutory construction is always the language of
the statute itself. 130 The plain meaning rule states that if the language of a
statute is clear, there is no need to look outside the statute to its legislative
history to ascertain the meaning.131 When a statute’s language is
unambiguous, the plain meaning rule will both start and end the judicial
inquiry.132 This canon crystallizes interpretational priorities: statutory
language is primary, legislative history is secondary.133 The one generally
recognized exception to the plain language rule is that the plain meaning will
be rejected if it would produce an absurd result.134
When the meaning of specific statutory language is at issue, courts
will first look to see if the statute provides a definition.135 A statutorily
provided definition will govern if applicable in the context used.136 If the
clearly, the interpretation should not significantly change the federal-state balance in the
prosecution of crimes).
128
Bass, 404 U.S. at 349; see also Brett Senior & Assocs. v. Fitzgerald, 2007 WL
2043377 at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding it unlikely that Congress, given its concern “about the
appropriate scope of Federal jurisdiction” in the area of computer crime, intended essentially
to criminalize state-law beaches of contract) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3 (1986)).
129
Bass, 404 U.S. at 349; see also Shamrock, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (“such rule
requires a court confronted with two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than
the other, to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite
language.”).
130
McAllister, 225 F.3d at 986 (explaining that the starting point in interpreting a
statute is always the language of the statute itself); see, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
U.S. 337, 340–41 (1997) (determining whether the language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning by looking “to the language itself, the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”).
131
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) (finding that the
straightforward language of the statute left no reason to resort to legislative history).
132
Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147–48 (“[w]e do not resort of legislative history to cloud a
statutory text that is clear.”).
133
Kim, supra note 95, at 41.
134
See, e.g., United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 47 n.5 (1994) (dismissing
an interpretation said to lead to an absurd result); see also Public Citizen v. Department of
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (“[w]here the literal reading of a statutory term would
compel an ‘odd result’. . . we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend
the term its proper scope.”).
135
Kim, supra note 95, at 5; see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979).
136
Kim, supra note 95, at 5; see also Orbit One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex
Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (rejecting a broad interpretation of the
CFAA because it would be imprudent to interpret the CFAA in a manner inconsistent with its
plain meaning and to transform the common law civil tort of misappropriation of confidential
information into a criminal offense).
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statute does not define the word but has an accepted meaning in the area of
law addressed by the statute, the court will import the meaning from the
whole term and not break down the component parts.137 Words that are not
defined and are not terms of art are customarily given their ordinary
meanings, which are often derived from the dictionary.138
E. No “Mere Surplusage”
Congress acts purposefully in enacting and amending statutes.139
Courts should presume that Congress intended each of a statute’s terms to
have meaning, and courts should give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute.140 Courts should avoid any interpretation that insinuates
that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it
employed.141 When Congress amends a statute by altering words, it does so
with the intent of changing the statute’s meaning.142 Prudentially, the
converse of this rule creates a corollary canon: courts should not add
language that Congress has not included.143 On a slightly broader scale, this
construction principle also applies to statutes as they stand in relation to each
other. Congress will not enact duplicative statutes, so where other federal
statutes would apply, the statute at issue should not.144

137
Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 483 (1990) (“where a phrase in a statute
appears to have become a term of art . . . any attempt to break down the term into its
constituent words is not apt to illuminate its meaning.”).
138
F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (explaining that in the absence of
a statutory definition, “we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural
meaning”); see also Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 459 (finding that “[m]ost courts that have actually
considered the issue of the meaning of the word ‘access’ in the CFAA have basically turned to
the dictionary meaning.”).
139
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (quoting Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U.S. 135, 140–41 (1994) (“[j]udges should hestitate….to treat [as surplusage]
statutory terms in any setting, and resistance should be heightened when the words describe an
element of a criminal offense.”).
140
Id. at 146 (rejecting interpretation that would have made “uses” and “carries”
redundant in statute penalizing using or carrying a firearm in commission of an offense
because, “[w]e assume that Congress used two terms because it intended each term to have a
particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”).
141
Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (finding that a court has the
duty, if possible, to avoid any construction of a statute “which implies that the legislature was
ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.”).
142
Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (stating that when Congress acts to
amend a statute, “we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”).
143
Kim, supra note 95, at 13.
144
Id. at 13–14.
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F. The Canon of Consistency
Avoiding due process concerns requires courts to interpret statutes
with criminal and non-criminal applications consistently.145 Additionally, a
term or phrase appearing in several places in a statute should be interpreted
with the same meaning each time it appears.146 This construction principle
should be employed when interpreting the CFAA as the statute not only has
both criminal and civil applications, but repeats the same terms (“without
authorization” and “exceeds authorized access”) in several subsections.147
This canon of construction means that once a court interprets a term or
provision of the CFAA, that definition will govern all future CFAA cases in
the jurisdiction.148 Courts defining “authorization” in the context of a
business dispute concerning monetary damages should be mindful that the
decided definition will govern with equal force to a dispute involving
criminal punishment.149
IV. THE CURRENT SPLIT
A court’s interpretation of the CFAA dramatically affects whether an
employee is liable for misusing information gained from company
145

See, e.g., United States v. Bigham, 812 F.2d 943, 948 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting
that when Congress allows the same standard to govern criminal and civil cases, it is “of no
significance . . . [w]hether a case is brought on the civil or criminal side of the docket.”).
146
Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 143; see also Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc.,
551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007) (stating that “identical words and phrases within the same statute
should normally be given the same meaning.”).
147
Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 143; Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859. Rejecting the government’s
suggestion that the court adopt the government’s proposed definition of “exceeds authorized
access” for the subsection at issue, and still use narrower interpretations for the other times it
is used in the statute because that result would be inconsistent. Noting that because the phrase
“exceeds authorized access” appears five times in the first seven subsections of the CFAA, the
court must consider how its adopted interpretation will operate wherever the phrase appears.
Id.
148
Bigham, 812 F.2d at 948; see Hernacki, supra note 82, at 1548. The mens rea
requirements vary within the provisions of the CFAA, but the actus reas usually involves
either or both of the terms “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access.” For
example, the fraud provision of the CFAA requires both intent to defraud and violative access
that furthers the intended fraud; in contrast, another provision requires no mens rea and only
violative access is required. In a case of first impression, if the court is dealing with the fraud
provision in a civil case where the defendant has committed obvious wrongdoing, a broad
interpretation of the term “unauthorized access” may make sense. However, this definition
will carry over to all other CFAA cases. The definition which fit naturally in the context it was
made may not be similarly appropriate if the next case consists of criminal liability and no
wrongdoing.
149
See Kerr, supra note 26, at 1641–42 (noting that courts are more likely to hold
a defendant liable under an ambiguous statute when the stakes involve a business dispute
between competitors than when government seeks to impose jail time on an individual. The
problem becomes, these same definitions are then used in criminal settings where it is jail
time, and not money damages, at stake.).
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computers.150 There are three primary ways that federal courts interpret the
term “authorization.”151 Two of these interpretations are broad, focusing on
the intent of the employee to determine whether the employee’s actions
furthered or frustrated the interests of the employer.152 Courts following a
broad, agency-based interpretation use principles of agency law and hold that
authorization terminates whenever an employee acts against his employer’s
interests.153 Courts endorsing the other broad view analyze authorization by
examining underlying contractual obligations and company policies.154 In
contrast, the third approach takes a considerably more restrained view.155
Instead of examining the employee’s subjective intent, this narrow
interpretation of the CFAA focuses objectively on whether the employer
granted authorization to the employee.156
A. The Broad View of Agency Theory
The Seventh Circuit applies a broad view of agency theory that,
grounded in principles of agency law, is the most employer-friendly
interpretation of the CFAA.157 This approach examines the status of an
agency relationship between an employer and employee to determine
whether access to a computer was authorized.158 Under an employeremployee agency relationship, an employee owes a special duty of loyalty to
his employer which requires him to act solely for the benefit of the
employer.159 An employee has “authorization” under the CFAA as long as
his work furthers the interests of his employer.160 Once an employee acts
150

Audra A. Dial & John M. Moye, Fourth Circuit Widens Split Over CFAA and
Employees Violating Computer Use Restrictions, 17 No. 11 CYBERSPACE LAW 1 (2012).
151
See generally Kerr, supra note 26. Reacting to the courts inconsistent treatment
of the CFAA, Professor Orin Kerr has proposed an alternate approach: the code-based
approach. Under this view, access to a protected computer is unauthorized when a user
circumvents a firewall or username/login screen to access the system. Id. While this approach
has been extensively analyzed by commentators, it has not been expressly adopted by courts.
Because this Comment analyzes how the CFAA has been treated in courts, the code-based
approach falls outside the scope of this Comment. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 460 (determining
that “[i]t is simply noted that, while defining “access” in terms of a code-based restriction
might arguably be a preferable approach, no case has adopted it, and the CFAA legislative
history does not support it.”).
152
Kapitanyan, supra note 80, at 433–34. To determine whether the employee’s
conduct was authorized or not, the broad view focuses on the employee’s intent, whereas the
narrow view focuses on the actions of the employer. Id.
153
Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421.
154
Explorica, 274 F.3d at 577. See generally Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1127.
155
Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1127.
156
Id.
157
Field, supra note 48.
158
Citrin, 440 F.3d at 418.
159
Field, supra note 48, at 823.
160
See Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 39 (1958) (stating that the agent is to
act only for the principal’s benefit).
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adversely to his employer’s interest, both the agency relationship and
authorization under the CFAA immediately terminate.161
An agency interpretation of the CFAA requires no affirmative
employer action for authorization to terminate.162 Authorization is implicitly
revoked whenever an employee accesses a computer for purposes that do not
further his employer’s interest.163 Focusing entirely on the employee’s state
of mind, all it takes to terminate authorization and incur liability under this
view of the CFAA is an employee action not wholly in the employer’s best
interests. 164 An employee acts “without authorization” under the CFAA
when he breaches a state law duty of loyalty or fiduciary duty to the
employer.165
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v.
Citrin is generally heralded as the leading case for an agency-based
interpretation of the CFAA, though the case was largely based on a district
case decided a few years earlier.166 Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v.
Safeguard Self Storage, Inc. was the first case to apply an agency theory of
authorization to a CFAA claim addressing the exploits of a rogue
employee.167 Both companies in the self-storage business, Shurgard was an
established industry leader while Safeguard had recently entered the market
as a direct competitor.168 Safeguard approached one of Shurgard’s regional
managers, Eric Leland, and offered him a position with their company.169
While employed with Shurgard and in breach of his employment agreement,
Leland used his employee access to email confidential and proprietary
information to Safeguard representatives.170 Leland continued to supply
Safeguard with this type of information even after leaving Shurgard.171

161

Field, supra note 48, at 823 (asserting that once an employee terminates the
agency relationship by acting adversely to his employer’s interests, he is also acting “without
authorization” since authorization is a privilege tied inextricably to the agency relationship).
162
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 112 (1958) (“[u]nless otherwise agreed, the
authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse
interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal”); see also
Kaplan, supra note 14.
163
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 112 (1958).
164
Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21; see also Shawn E. Tuma, “What Does CFAA Mean
and Why Should I Care?” A Primer on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for Civil
Litigators, 63 S. C. L. REV. 141, 176 (2011) (explaining how the agency theory relates to other
interpretations of “without authorization”); see Urban, supra note 47, at 1399.
165
Field, supra note 48, at 823–24 (discussing the evolution of the agency-based
theory as a direct application of agency law to interpret authorization under the CFAA).
166
Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc. 119 F. Supp. 2d
1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (this case has since been overruled by LVRC Holdings v. Brekka,
581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009)).
167
Kapitanyan, supra note 80, at 417.
168
Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 1122.
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Shurgard subsequently sued Safeguard for a litany of state tort claims as well
as violations of the CFAA.172
Applying the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, the court concluded that because Leland’s authorization terminated
when his interests became adverse to Shurgard, he was without authorization
when he obtained and sent the confidential information to Safeguard.173 Once
the court determined that Leland was “without authorization,” it found no
need to decide whether Leland had also “exceeded authorized use” under the
CFAA since liability was established with proof of either term under the
subsection alleged.174 Reaching its conclusion based solely on the plain
language of the statute, the court went on to cite additional support from the
CFAA’s legislative history.175 Noting the narrowness of the original CFAA’s
scope, the court concluded that subsequent amendments evinced clear
congressional intent to widen coverage to cover the type of misuse alleged
by Shurgard.176
Citing Shurgard as authority, the Seventh Circuit officially adopted
the agency theory in 2006.177 In Citrin the employee breached his
employment contract with International Airport Centers (IAC) by quitting his
job to start a competing company.178 Before returning IAC’s company
laptop, Citrin deleted all of the data by installing a secure-erasure program to
guarantee the data would not be recoverable.179 IAC sued Citrin, alleging he
violated the CFAA by knowingly and intentionally causing damage to a
protected computer without authorization.180
Analyzing Citrin’s actions under principles of agency law, the court
found that he unilaterally terminated his agency relationship with IAC the
moment he resolved to quit and delete the files.181 Citrin’s authorization to
access the laptop was inextricably tied to his agency status; without agency
172
Id. In addition to the CFAA claims, Shurgard brought state law claims alleging
misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, unfair competition, and tortious interference
with a business expectancy. Id.
173
Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (holding that, based on the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, § 112 (1958), authority of employee ended when employee became an
agent for a competing company. Once an employee’s authority ends, he or she loses any prior
authorization.).
174
Id. at 1125 n.4.
175
Id. at 1127 (analyzing the CFAA’s legislative history to ensure that the court’s
finding would not produce an absurd result).
176
Id. The court rejected Safeguard’s argument that the CFAA was limited to
large-scale, industry and government computers whose information could severely harm the
public if the information was damaged. Id. The court found the Senate report’s emphasis on
the purpose of the CFAA to prevent individuals from abusing their right to use a computer
demonstrated that a broad meaning was appropriate.
177
Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421 (establishing that an employee acts without
authorization for purposes of the CFAA when his intentions become adverse to his employer).
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
181
Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419.
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status he had no authority to access the computer.182 The court held Citrin
liable even though he was still an employee when he accessed the laptop and
was not violating any company policies prohibiting him from deleting
emails.183 Acknowledging that under an agency view of the CFAA the
difference between the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds
authorized access” is “paper thin…but not quite invisible,” the court quickly
concluded that the principles of agency law rendered Citrin’s actions
“without authorization.”184
B. The Broad View of Contract Theory
The other broad interpretation of the CFAA finds its roots in contract
law, focusing on the contractual relationship between the parties.185 The
First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits use underlying contractual agreements and
employee policies as the basis for analyzing authorization.186 Liability under
the CFAA may attach if a court finds that an employee accessed a protected
computer in a way that was prohibited or in excess of limitations set by a
contract or a clearly communicated employer policy.187
The First Circuit articulated this contract approach in EF Cultural
Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc. by finding that an employment agreement could
establish the parameters of authorized access under the CFAA.188 EF
Cultural Travel BV (EF), a well-established company, sued a newly-formed
competitor company Explorica after discovering that Explorica had created a
robot “scraper” to mine EF’s website and undercut EF’s prices.189
Explorica’s vice president Philip Gormley was a former vice president at
EF.190 Gormley voluntarily signed a confidentiality agreement that prohibited
disclosure of any information “which might reasonably be construed to be
contrary to the interests of EF” while employed with EF.191 In his new
position with Explorica, Gormley used his intimate knowledge of EF’s
business practices to direct the design of the computer scraper that was used
to gather enough information to undercut EF’s prices.192
The First Circuit held that Gormley’s use of the scraper “exceeded
authorized access” under the CFAA because its use breached the

182

Id. at 420–21. Violating the duty of loyalty, or failing to disclose adverse
interests, voids the agency relationship.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 420.
185
Urban, supra note 47, at 1378.
186
Id. at 1372.
187
Id.
188
Explorica, 274 F.3d at 578–79.
189
Id. at 580.
190
Id. at 582.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 579–80.
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confidentiality agreement that Gormley signed with EF.193 The court
reasoned that Gormley acted contrary to EF’s interests in violation of the
confidentiality agreement when he used his insider knowledge of EF’s
business practices to the advantage of a competitor.194 Once the First Circuit
decided that Gormley exceeded his authorized access, it declined to examine
whether he was also “without authorization” since the predicate claim
required only one of the two terms.195
Starting from a contract-based interpretation of the CFAA, the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits extended the principles of contract law to base liability
on employer policies that had been communicated to employees.196 The Fifth
Circuit reached this conclusion in U.S. v. John, a criminal case involving
fraud.197 Defendant John had authorization to access customer account
information as an account manager for Citibank.198 John attended trainings
and was aware of the corporate policy prohibiting misuse of Citigroup’s
computer information and confidential customer information.199
Disregarding these policies, John accessed Citigroup’s computer system to
obtain confidential customer information which she then provided to others
who used the information to make fraudulent charges.200 The court held that
John exceeded her authorized access by violating Citibank’s clearly
communicated and well-established policies that prohibited accessing
customer data in furtherance of a criminally fraudulent scheme.201
Acknowledging the Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding in LVRC Holdings, LLC
v. Brekka, the Fifth Circuit explained the lack of notice issue predominant in
Brekka was not at issue for John because she had reason to know that
accessing data in furtherance of fraud was unauthorized.202

193

Id. at 581–82.
Explorica, 274 F.3d. at 582–83 (stating that “[a]ppellants would face an uphill
battle trying to argue that it was not against EF’s interests for appellants to use the tour codes
to mine EF’s pricing data.”).
195
Id. at 581 (concluding that because the defendant “exceeded authorized
access,” the court did not need to reach the more general arguments made about statutory
meaning, including whether use of a scraper alone renders access unauthorized).
196
United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 2010); see also United States
v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010).
197
John, 597 F.3d at 269.
198
Id. at 273.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id. Despite stating, “while we do not necessarily agree that violating a
confidentiality agreement under circumstances such as those in EF Cultural Travel BV would
give rise to criminal culpability . . .” the court found that John knew that her access in
furtherance of a criminally fraudulent scheme was outside her permitted access. Id.
202
Id. at 273–74. The Ninth Circuit was primarily concerned that unless an
employer affirmatively rescinded computer access, an employee would have no reason to
know that personal use of a company computer would constitute a criminal violation. The
Fifth Circuit concluded notice was not an issue in this case because John had reason to know
that accessing company data to further a criminal act could incur criminal liability. Id.
194
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The Eleventh Circuit adopted the broad, contract-based
interpretation of the CFAA in United States v. Rodriguez.203 Rodriguez was
charged with intentionally accessing a computer without authorization or
exceeding authorized access, and obtaining information from a department or
agency of the United States.204 While working for the Social Security
Administration (Administration), Rodriguez repeatedly accessed multiple
non-business related accounts despite a clearly-stated employer policy
prohibiting non-business use of company computers.205 This policy warned
employees that they faced criminal penalties if they violated policies on
authorized use of databases.206 Although Rodriguez refused to sign a written
acknowledgement of the policy, he attended mandatory office trainings and
received office memorandums and daily alerts on company computers that
all served to reinforce the policy.207 Examining the plain language of the
CFAA and the Administration’s policies, the court ultimately concluded that
even though there was no formal written agreement in place, accessing
information in violation of a corporate computer-use policy equated to
“exceeding authorized access” under the CFAA.208
Courts have also applied a contract-based approach to cover network
service provider agreements.209 Under this application of a contract-based
theory, once someone uses a computer in a way that violates his contract
with the provider, he has “exceeded his authorized use” and is in violation of
the CFAA.210 Applying this approach to terms of service agreements allows
website owners and service providers to establish criminal liability through
terms of service.211 These terms of service cases appear to hold that a
provider has subjective and nearly total power to decide which types of
access constitute unauthorized access with respect to data available to the
public through the internet.212 Allowing criminal liability to hinge on terms
of service agreements that are rarely read, difficult to comprehend, and

203

Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260.
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B). This lessfrequently invoked CFAA provision applied because Rodriguez’s employer was the Social
Security Administration, which is a government agency.
205
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263.
206
Id. at 1260.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
See e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252–53
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding defendant company acted without authorization when it violated
posted restrictions, terms of use, on plaintiff’s website); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM,
Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that LCGM’s use of AOL to send bulkemails in violation of AOL’s terms of service constituted access in excess of authorization).
210
See Hernacki, supra note 82, at 1555.
211
See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1582.
212
See Winn, supra note 30, at 1411–12.
204
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subject to change without notice led one district court to declare the CFAA
unconstitutionally vague.213
In United States v. Drew, the court overturned the defendant’s
misdemeanor CFAA conviction after a jury acquitted her of the felony
CFAA charges.214 The court denied Drew’s original motion to dismiss the
felony CFAA charges finding the scienter element in the felony provision
saved the statute’s constitutionality.215 However, once the felony charge
disappeared, the court concluded that the CFAA’s misdemeanor provision
failed both prongs of the void for vagueness doctrine, and due process could
not be afforded to citizens if every breach of a terms of service provision
could be criminally actionable.216
C. The Narrow View of the CFAA
Under a narrow view of the CFAA, accessing data without
authorization occurs only when initial access is not permitted because misuse
of information is not within the statute’s scope.217 Once an employee is
granted authorization to access an employer’s computer, that employee does
not violate the CFAA regardless of how he or she subsequently uses the
data.218 The narrow view determines whether authorization existed by
looking solely at the actions of the employer, whereas the broad views
examine the employee’s motives.219

213
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 449 (overturning misdemeanor conviction under CFAA
based on defendant exceeding the scope of authorized access as defined by MySpace’s terms
of service agreement); see also David A. Puckett, Terms of Service and the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act: A Trap for the Unwary?, 7 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 53 (2011) (dividing terms of
service agreements into four categories to demonstrate different practical and constitutional
problems when applied to CFAA claims: wholly unexpected terms of service, utterly vague
terms of service, spectacularly complex terms of service, and terms of service that abut First
Amendment freedoms).
214
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 451.
215
Id. The scienter element present in the 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) felony
charge is the requirement that the accessing of a computer without authorization is intentional.
216
Id. at 464. Anyone who uses a computer connected to the internet and views
information has already met two of the three elements to § 1030(a)(2)(C). The third element
requires intentionally accessing the computer’s information either without authorization or by
exceeding authorized access. Concluding that it would be unconstitutional to hold every
person who intentionally violates a terms of service agreement criminally liable, the court held
that the defendant’s CFAA misdemeanor conviction was unconstitutionally vague. The court
found that the CFAA provision violated both prongs of the void for vagueness doctrine due to
the lack of minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement and due to deficiencies in notice
which meant that people of “common intelligence” would not be on notice that a breach of a
terms of service agreement can bring criminal charges. Id.
217
Kapitanyan, supra note 80, at 426.
218
Federal Judge Highlights Dissention Over Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
CIRCUIT SPLIT BLOG (May 22, 2012) http://www.circuitsplits.com/2012/05/ federal-judgehighlights-dissension-over-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act.html.
219
See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.
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In a severe departure from broad views, the Ninth Circuit adopted a
narrow interpretation of the CFAA in Brekka and used the recent case U.S v.
Nosal to reaffirm its position.220 This unflinchingly narrow interpretation has
quickly picked up steam, garnering support from several other circuits and
numerous district courts.221
In Brekka, LVRC brought several state tort claims and a CFAA
claim against former employee Christopher Brekka.222 Alleging that Brekka
emailed LVRC files to his personal account without authorization, LVRC
argued Brekka was either without authorization, or exceeded his authorized
access, the moment he decided to use the computer in a way adverse to his
employer’s interest.223 Invoking several canons of statutory construction, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Brekka, holding that
he did not violate the CFAA.224
First, without a statutory definition for “authorization,” the court
consulted a dictionary to determine the ordinary, common meaning of the
word.225 Defining authorization to mean permission, the court concluded that
because LVRC gave Brekka permission to use the company computer, he
had authorization to access company files.226 Next, the court examined the
plain language of the statute for any evidence to support LVRC’s argument
that Congress implied an agency relationship, but found none.227 Entirely

220
221

Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1127; see also Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863–64.
See infra note 246 (summarizing district courts that use a narrow interpretation

of the CFAA).
222

Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129. Plaintiffs alleged that Brekka accessed LVRC’s
computers during both his employment with LVRC and after he left the company. Finding
that LVRC failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Brekka accessed
the LVRC website without authorization after he left the company, the court focused on
Brekka’s authorization during the time he was employed with plaintiff.
223
Id. LVRC was limited to the agency theory since Brekka did not have a written
employment agreement, nor did LVRC promulgate employee guidelines that would prohibit
employees from emailing LVRC documents to personal computers.
224
Id. at 1135.
225
Id. at 1132–33 (applying the fundamental canon of statutory construction to
define “without authorization.” Unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.).
226
Id. at 1133. See also Lockheed, 2006 WL 2683058 at *5 (M.D. Fla. 2006). The
court explained the difference between the two terms “without authorization” and “exceeds
authorized access” under a narrow interpretation of the CFAA:
[T]hus it is plain from the outset that Congress singled out two groups of
accessers, those ‘without authorization’ (or those below authorization,
meaning those having no permission to access whatsoever—typically
outsiders, as well as insiders that are not permitted any computer access)
and those exceeding authorization (or those above authorization, meaning
those that go beyond the permitted access granted to them—typically
insiders exceeding whatever access is permitted to them).
Id.
227
Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135 (rejecting an agency interpretation because,
“[N]othing in the CFAA suggests that a defendant’s liability for accessing a computer without
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unpersuaded by LVRC’s Citrin line of reasoning, the court decided that the
plain language, canon of consistency, and the rule of lenity all pointed
strongly to a narrow interpretation where authorization depends on actions
taken by the employer and not the employee.228 The court reasoned that
narrowly interpreting the CFAA was necessary in order to avoid interpreting
a criminal statute in a surprising or unexpected way.229
In the recent criminal case U.S. v. Nosal, the Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed its holding in Brekka by not only denouncing broad
interpretations of the CFAA, but urging circuit courts applying broad
interpretations to reconsider.230 After Nosal left his job at Korn/Ferry, he
convinced current Korn/Ferry employees to use their authorized log-in
information to steal information for use in Nosal’s new business venture.231
The government charged Nosal and his co-conspirators with numerous
CFAA counts.232
Declaring that the CFAA failed to provide a remedy for
misappropriated information where authorization by the employer had not
been rescinded, the court held that Nosal’s co-conspirators did not violate the
CFAA when they retrieved confidential information through company use
accounts.233 The court rejected the government’s proposed broad reading of
the CFAA, finding a broad interpretation would transform the CFAA “from
an anti-hacking statute into an expansive misappropriation statute.” 234 The
court countered the government’s interpretation by reasoning, “[I]f Congress
meant to expand the scope of criminal liability to everyone who uses a
computer in violation of computer use restrictions—which may well include
everyone who uses a computer—we would expect it to use language better

authorization turns on whether the defendant breached a state law duty of loyalty to an
employer.”).
228
Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129–35. First, the court engaged in a plain language
reading of the statute, construing the term “without authorization” to mean “without
permission.” Explicitly rejecting the agency theory because it essentially equates the terms
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access,” the court explained that because
Congress included two separate phrases, the only way one would not be rendered meaningless
is if it meant different things. Lastly, the court concluded that the agency theory also violated
of the rule of lenity, which requires courts to limit the reach of criminal statutes to the clear
import of their text and construe any ambiguity against the government. Id.
229
Id. at 1135. If the employer has not rescinded the defendant’s right to use the
computer, the defendant would have no reason to know that making personal use of the
company computer in breach of a state law fiduciary duty to an employer would constitute a
criminal violation of the CFAA.
230
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862.
231
Id. at 856 (explaining that Korn/Ferry employees had authorization to access
the database, but Korn/Ferry had a policy forbidding disclosing confidential information).
232
Id. at 856.
233
Id. at 863–64 (finding that the plain language of the CFAA expressly prohibits
improper access of computer information; it does not prohibit misuse or misappropriation).
234
Id. at 857.
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suited to that purpose.”235 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found no evidence
in either the statutory language or history of the CFAA to indicate an
intentional displacement of the traditional state tort and contract laws
typically governing employer-employee relationships.236 Unimpressed by the
broad interpretations’ willingness to hang criminal liability on violations of
private computer use policies, the court found the implications appallingly
unconstitutional, and used canons of statutory construction and the rule of
lenity to settle on its narrow holding.237 Countering the dissent’s claim that
the majority’s feared “parade of horribles” was unfounded, the court cited to
a recent Florida district court case that involved a CFAA claim based on an
employee’s personal use of a company computer.238
The Fourth Circuit recently staked its claim on the narrow side of the
split when it decided WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller.239 The
court held that an employee does not violate the CFAA by downloading
confidential information later used in a competing business if, at the time the
information is downloaded, the employee was authorized to access the
system.240 Conscious of the canon of consistency and the statute’s criminal
provisions, the court examined the plain language and construed the statute
strictly to avoid an unanticipated or surprising result.241 The court explicitly
235

Id. (citing the presumption that Congress acts interstitially; unless Congress
conveys its purpose clearly, a statute will not be deemed to have significantly changed the
federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes).
236
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860 (explaining that employer-employee and companyconsumer relationships are traditionally governed by tort and contract law and that the
government’s proposed interpretation would unacceptably allow private parties to manipulate
computer use and employment policies into a basis for criminal law).
237
Id. at 856–64. Deciding that a broad reading of the CFAA would render it
unconstitutional for a myriad of reasons; primarily lack of notice. “Millions of unsuspecting
individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal conduct.” Id. It is impermissible to
allow employers to base criminal liability in what would otherwise be, at most a state tort or
contract claim. This could transform whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into
federal crimes simply because a computer is involved.
238
Id. at n.6 The Nosal majority cited Lee v. PMSI, Inc., No. 8:10 CV 2904 T
23TBM, 2011 WL 1742028 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2011), as an example of the type of
unacceptable claims that could come from a broad interpretation of the CFAA. Id. In Lee, an
employer counterclaimed against an employee’s wrongful termination suit. The counterclaim
alleged that the employee violated the CFAA when she used a company computer for personal
reasons like accessing Facebook and sending personal emails, in violation of a computer-use
policy. Although the district court dismissed the claim, the Nosal majority noted that, “it could
not have done so if ‘exceeds authorized access’ included violations of private computer use
policies.” Id.
239
Miller, 687 F.3d at 204 (originally plaintiff brought one CFAA claim and nine
state law claims to the district court, alleging that defendant had breached his employment
agreement by using company information for a competitive purpose. When the district court
dismissed the CFAA count for failure to state a claim, it declined to exercise jurisdiction over
the remaining state law claims. In a footnote, the court described nine alternative available
state law remedies that remained available for plaintiffs.).
240
Id.
241
Id. at 207.
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rejected the agency and contract views, finding both theories not only
contravene Congressional purpose, but are also unnecessary since state law
remedies already exist.242
The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on the Brekka court’s interpretation
of the term “authorization” in Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ International
Union of North America.243 The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s
complaint citing Brekka as persuasive authority.244 The decision strongly
suggests the Sixth Circuit would choose a narrow interpretation of the CFAA
as it found the defendants’ use of public communication systems to contact
the plaintiffs defeated allegations that the access was “without
authorization.”245 Meanwhile, numerous district courts within the Sixth
Circuit have openly embraced the narrow view.246

Our conclusion here likely will disappoint employers hoping for a means
to rein in rogue employees. But we are unwilling to contravene
Congress’s intent by transforming a statute meant to target hackers into a
vehicle for imputing liability to workers who access computers . . . in bad
faith, or who disregard a use policy. . . Providing such recourse not only is
unnecessary . . . but is violative of the Supreme Court’s counsel to
construe criminal statutes strictly.
Id.

242

Id. at 206 (describing the deficiencies of an agency theory: “[S]uch a rule
would mean that any employee who checked the latest Facebook posting or sporting event
scores in contravention of his employer’s use policy would be subject to the instantaneous
cessation of his agency and, as a result, would be left without any authorization to access his
employer’s computer systems.”).
243
Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 648 F.3d 295 (6th Cir.
2011) (holding that the defendant had not accessed information without authorization under
the CFAA because plaintiff’s information was open to the public and did not need
authorization to access).
244
Id. at 307.
245
Id. The heavy reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the
CFAA suggests that if the Sixth Circuit ever squarely addresses the meaning of “without
authorization” in an employment dispute, it would adopt a narrow view.
246
See Dana, 2012 WL 2524008 at *5 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012) (holding that
there was no violation of the CFAA because defendants were still employed with Dana Ltd at
the time they downloaded company information which they subsequently took with them to
work for a competitor, they were authorized to access the information in question); see e.g.
Ajuba, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 687 (holding that allegations that an employee lost any
authorization he had to access the employer’s computers, or, exceeded his authorization when
he accessed the computers in violation of confidentiality and use limitations, failed to state a
claim under the CFAA); see e.g. ReMedPar, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (construing “without
authorization” narrowly, and dismissing CFAA claim based on use of information that
employee was authorized to obtain in a fashion that was adverse to the employer’s interests);
see e.g. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 934–35 (W.D. Tenn. 2008)
(rejecting Citrin’s agency analysis, and dismissing the CFAA claim that was based not on the
employee’s accessing of information, but on his later misuse of the information, holding
“[C]ongress did not intend to create a private cause of action against employees whose crime .
. . merely involved the use of ordinary email in a manner disloyal to their employer and in
breach of their employment contract.”).
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V. ANALYSIS
Broad interpretations of the CFAA miss the mark in just about every
possible way.247 Agency and contract-based interpretations raise serious
constitutional concerns and demolish Congress’s intended scope by turning
an objective access statute into a series of murky subjective inquiries.248
Broad interpretations disregard established canons of statutory construction
and produce unexpected results not in accordance with Congressional intent
or due process.249 Additionally, broad interpretations fail to restrict the
CFAA to the types of crime intended by Congress.250 Adjudicating claims
outside the intended scope disrupts Congress’s delicate federal-state balance
and undermines traditional state powers.251
A narrow interpretation is the only way to ensure that the CFAA
remains constitutional and avoids surprising results.252 Following wellestablished canons of constructions, narrow interpretations comprehensively
define the statute’s terms to provide notice to employees and guidelines for
enforcement.253 Narrow interpretations also effectuate Congressional intent
by restricting the CFAA to types of claims not found in other statutes and
leaving existing state laws undisturbed.254 The CFAA requires a narrow
interpretation.255

247
See generally infra Part V (explaining how broad interpretations are
unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, do not follow canons of statutory construction, do not
effectuate Congressional intent, raise federalism concerns, and overstep Congressional spheres
of lawmaking, and onto traditional state powers).
248
See infra Part V.A–B (arguing broad interpretations render the CFAA
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
249
See supra Part II.A, Parts IV.A–B (comparing the actual purpose for the CFAA
to fight new types of computer misuse crimes with broad interpretations’ application of the
statute to address employee misappropriation).
250
See supra Part II.A, Part IV.A–B (comparing the type of crime Congress
intended to target with the CFAA to the types of crimes adjudicated under agency and
contract-based interpretations of the statute).
251
See supra Part II.A, infra Part V.D–E (comparing Congress’s carefully
restricted scope of the CFAA with broad interpretations’ expansive reach which overlaps
hugely with traditional state laws Congress meant to leave undisturbed).
252
See supra Part III.A–B, infra Part V (explaining requirements that all criminal
statutes must meet in order be constitutional and demonstrating that while broad
interpretations fall short, a narrowly interpreted CFAA remains constitutional).
253
See infra Part V.A–C (showing how selected canons of statutory construction
lead to a narrow interpretation, which, in turn meets the constitutional requirements for the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines).
254
See supra note 47, infra Part V.D (explaining the CFAA’s purpose as a gapfiller statute and demonstrating how broad interpretations inappropriately allow claims already
addressed by existing state laws).
255
See infra Parts V–VI (concluding a narrow interpretation is necessary to
effectuate Congressional intent and keep the statute constitutional).
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A. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine Requires a Narrow Interpretation of
the CFAA
Broad interpretations of the CFAA are unconstitutionally vague.256
To avoid due process concerns, the CFAA’s statutory language and judicial
interpretations must define “authorization” to give employees sufficient
notice of prohibited behavior and enough definiteness to guide
enforcement.257 At first blush, the statutory terms “without authorization”
and “exceeds authorized access” do not appear unduly ambiguous.258 Narrow
interpretations of the CFAA give employees notice of criminal conduct and
curb arbitrary enforcement by incorporating the commonly understood
definitions of the two critical terms.259 Conversely, injecting principles of
agency or contract law gives these critical terms unorthodox and unclear
meanings that fail to adequately notify employees of what behavior is
criminal and leave the statute vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement.260
Broad interpretations of the CFAA violate the notice prong of the
void for vagueness doctrine because they fail to define “authorization” in a
way that gives employees clear notice of prohibited computer activities.261
Nothing in the statutory language of the CFAA hints that authorization
depends on an agency relationship or an underlying contract.262 Moreover, by
removing an objective definition of “authorization,” broad interpretations
remove the required notice of prohibited behavior.263 Transforming
“authorization” into a subjective inquiry gives employees no reliable or
predictable way to determine if they have authorization.264 Employees cannot
act in conformity with the CFAA when the statute’s meaning varies

256

See supra notes 234–237 and accompanying text (rejecting broad
interpretations because they impermissibly expanded the scope of the CFAA).
257
See supra text accompanying note 103 (describing what the void for vagueness
doctrine requires from criminal statutes to be constitutional).
258
See supra text accompanying notes 225–226 (explaining that plain language,
commonly understood, and dictionary definitions define “without authorization” and
“exceeding authorized access” respectively as no permission, and going beyond what is
permitted).
259
See supra note 228 (describing why a narrow interpretation of the CFAA was
necessary to keep it within the bounds of constitutionality); see also supra text accompanying
notes 239–242 (explaining the Fourth Circuit’s narrow reading of the CFAA).
260
See supra note 216 (describing why agency and contract-based interpretations
fail to provide a clear definition for the CFAA’s critical terms).
261
See supra note 103 and accompanying text (detailing the notice required under
the void for vagueness doctrine and showing such notice is enough to allow citizens to
conform their behavior to lawful conduct).
262
See supra Part II.F (describing the statutory language of the CFAA); see also
supra note 82 (describing the statute).
263
See supra note 237 (describing why a broad interpretation lacks the notice
required for all criminal statutes).
264
See supra text accompanying notes 162–164 (establishing that under agency
theory, authorization depends entirely on the employee’s mental state).
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according to the personal predilections of each employer.265 Broad
interpretations engender too much unpredictability in place of the notice
required by the vagueness doctrine.266
Agency-based applications of the CFAA were established in cases
featuring former employees whose tortious malfeasance made notice a
nonissue.267 Despite the fact that agency law does not translate or practically
apply to the nuanced pragmatisms of everyday employment, the holding
from Citrin governs in at least the First Circuit.268 In the First Circuit,
terminating an employee’s authorization after any breach of loyalty would
likely mean that an employee who takes ten minutes to peruse social media
sites has terminated her access if her employer decides that act was adverse
to the company’s interest.269 Unbeknownst to the employee, her
authorization would be terminated even after closing out of the website and
returning to work.270 Weeks, months, or years of diligent work later, the
employee’s access is still seemingly terminated because she has been
“without authorization” since acting contrary to her employer’s interest.271
A myriad of innocuous activities like checking the news, weather, or
emailing a friend could suddenly carry criminal penalties under agencybased interpretations of the CFAA.272 No court applying agency law to the
CFAA has considered the effect of momentary work distractions or has
decided what type of act is sufficiently adverse to terminate an employee’s
authorization.273 The confusion and vagueness compounds when employers
decide, maybe even retroactively, when authorization terminates.274 What
265

See supra text accompanying notes 162–164 (establishing that under agency
theory, authorization depends entirely on the employee’s mental state).
266
See supra note 237 (describing why a broad interpretation lacks the notice
required for all criminal statutes).
267
See supra notes 157–184 and accompanying text (summarizing the emergence
of agency-based interpretations of the CFAA in cases like Explorica, Shurgard, and Citrin).
268
See supra text accompanying note 173 (holding that an employer’s subjective
view of an employee’s adverse act terminates authorization immediately).
269
See supra text accompanying notes 177–184 (demonstrating how the holding
from Citrin could apply to a less extreme, but very typical employment situation).
270
See supra notes 177, 182 (applying agency law to immediately terminate
authorization upon an employee’s adverse thought or action with no discussion of when
authorization might reinstate).
271
See supra notes 177, 182 (applying agency law to immediately terminate
authorization upon an employee’s adverse thought or action with no discussion of when
authorization might reinstate).
272
See supra text accompanying notes 162–165 (explaining how terminating
authorization depends on the employer’s subjective view of what employee actions do not
further the interest of the company).
273
See supra text accompanying notes 157–184 (summarizing main agency cases;
none address the issue of reinstating an employee’s authorization).
274
See supra text accompanying notes 157–184 (case law has not yet addressed
this kind of ex post-facto application in an agency interpretation of the CFAA. However, it is
a logical extension of current holdings, and if allowed, would trigger even more due process
concerns.).
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one employer may tolerate—occasional non-business-related web
browsing—another might find an outrageous and blatant misuse of company
time and resources.275 Within the spectrum of typical employee behavior,
agency interpretations of the CFAA simply do not provide employees with
sufficient notice of authorization.276
Proponents of contract-based interpretations of the CFAA claim that
an employee’s signature on a contract or a clearly communicated company
policy fulfills any notice requirement.277 This argument misses the mark
because nothing in the language of the CFAA puts an ordinary employee on
notice that authorization is revoked and criminal liability triggered by
breaching a private contract.278 Absent express statutory language to the
contrary, an ordinary employee would reasonably expect that breaching a
private agreement could result in exposure to civil liability, not
imprisonment.279 Unless the underlying agreement specifically delineates
employee actions that terminate “authorization,” notice is not there.280
Additionally, many company policies or employment contracts
contain vague terms or provisions.281 For example, generic terms prohibiting
“non-business purposes,” or limiting computer use to “legitimate company
business,” provide insufficient notice to employees of what computer use is
prohibited.282 Countless employees sit in front of computers all day; without
detailed instructions to guide them through prohibited uses or what is
permitted if done off the clock, employees could inadvertently breach a
contract while reading the news online over lunch.283 Like the agency
approach, a contract-based interpretation of the CFAA is vague because
employees do not have sufficient notice of prohibited behavior when

275

See supra text accompanying notes 162–165 (explaining how terminating
authorization depends on the employer’s subjective view of what employee actions do not
further the interest of the company).
276
See supra notes 103–105 (requiring all criminal statutes to provide enough
definiteness to put ordinary people on notice as to what conduct is prohibited so they can
conform their behavior accordingly).
277
See supra text accompanying note 202 (explaining notice is not an issue when
the defendant had reason to know that accessing data to further a criminal act could incur
criminal liability).
278
See supra Part II.F (explaining current provisions of the CFAA); see also note
82 (describing the statute).
279
See supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing breaches of contracts as
an area traditionally governed by contract law).
280
See supra notes 209–213 and accompanying text (describing various problems
with allowing contract drafters to establish criminal penalties).
281
See supra text accompanying note 191 (describing how the underlying contract
term that was breached in Explorica prohibited disclosing information “contrary to the
interests of EF”).
282
See supra note 104 (failing to distinguish between innocent conduct and
conduct calculated to cause harm can render a statute vague).
283
See supra note 104 (failing to distinguish between innocent conduct and
conduct calculated to cause harm can render a statute vague).
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authorization depends on an employer’s subjective interpretation of an
underlying agreement.284
In contrast to the broad approaches’ vacillating definition of
“authorization,” a narrow interpretation of the CFAA ensures that employees
have notice of prohibited conduct.285 Due process concerns of notice are
alleviated through a narrow interpretation’s objective definition of
“authorization.”286 A narrow interpretation requires employers to take
affirmative action to restrict or rescind authorization instead of arbitrary
employee activity or an employer’s subjective intent immediately
terminating authorization.287 An ordinary employee understands that
information accessed by entering false information or circumventing security
measures would be unauthorized.288 A narrow interpretation of the CFAA is
the only way to ensure that employers have the notice required of all criminal
statutes.289
The inherent uncertainty plaguing the broad interpretations’
definition of “authorization” also leaves the CFAA highly susceptible to
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in violation of the vagueness
doctrine’s second prong.290 Almost any employee action could be construed
to terminate authorization when an employer subjectively defines the agency
relationship or interprets a broadly-drafted contract.291 Under an agency
interpretation, an employee’s inadvertent termination of his agency status
means that each time he subsequently accesses a company computer, he is
“without authorization,” which violates the CFAA.292 Similarly, contractbased interpretations could unwittingly catch millions of employees in
technical breach of broadly-drafted, vaguely-worded employment
284
See supra note 202 (explaining how unsuspecting employees could incur civil
and criminal liability under agency-interpretations of the CFAA because employers do not
need to inform employees when authorization has terminated).
285
See supra note 233 (defining the term authorization by its commonly
understood definition, permission, gives employees notice that accessing a company computer
without permission is prohibited).
286
See supra text accompanying notes 217–219, 226 (using the commonly
understood definitions of authorization to mean permission).
287
See supra note 107 (explaining that a statute is impermissibly vague if
enforcement depends on a completely subjective standard).
288
See supra note 233 (defining the term authorization by its commonly
understood definition, permission, gives employees notice that accessing a company computer
without permission is prohibited).
289
See supra notes 110–112 and accompanying text (discussing how courts can
save a potentially vague statute through a narrow interpretation).
290
See supra text accompanying notes 106–108 (detailing the second prong of the
void-for-vagueness test).
291
See supra text accompanying notes 161–165, 210–211 (illustrating that
terminating authorization depends on the employer’s subjective view of what employee
actions do not further the interest of the company or on how an employer interprets an
employment agreement).
292
See supra note 173 and accompanying text (explaining that terminating agency
relationship contemporaneously terminates any authorization).
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agreements.293 Using the CFAA, employers, service providers, and the
government can target whomever they want by deciding either that agency
status has terminated or by interpreting an underlying contract to find a
breach.294 Without guidelines to ensure that only serious computer misuse
crimes are prosecuted, broad interpretations of the CFAA are
unconstitutionally vague.295
Unlike broad interpretations, a narrow interpretation of the CFAA
removes the threat of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by eliminating
unsuspecting and innocent employees from the statute’s scope.296 The
subjective definition of “authorization” under broad interpretations provides
neither sufficient notice to employees nor the predictability in enforcement
that due process requires.297 These interpretations of the CFAA are
unconstitutionally vague.298 Until Congress acts, courts are faced with the
responsibility of constitutionally interpreting the CFAA.299 A narrow
interpretation is the only way the CFAA passes constitutional muster under
the vagueness doctrine.300
B. The Overbreadth Doctrine Requires a Narrow Interpretation of the
CFAA
Broad interpretations hurl the CFAA into the depths of
unconstitutional overbreadth.301 Agency and contract-based interpretations of
the CFAA render the statute overbroad by criminalizing an incredible range
of conduct in which normal, law-abiding citizens regularly engage.302
Keeping lawful and constitutionally protected behavior out of the CFAA’s
293
See supra text accompanying notes 211–213 (allowing service providers to
draft agreement contracts which result in criminal sanctions gives them complete power).
294
See supra notes 213–216 and accompanying text (criminally prosecuting a
woman for breaching MySpace’s terms of service agreement).
295
See supra note 237 (finding broad interpretations unconstitutionally vague by
transforming entire categories of otherwise innocent behavior into federal crimes).
296
See supra text accompanying notes 234–235 (explaining how broad
interpretations transform the CFAA from a criminal hacking statute into an expansive
misappropriation statute).
297
See supra notes 106–108 and accompanying text (drawing no distinction
between innocent conduct and conduct calculated to cause harm renders a statute
unconstitutionally vague).
298
See supra note 237 (outlining the different ways that broad interpretations fail
to provide notice and encourage arbitrary enforcement).
299
See supra notes 110–112 and accompanying text (directing courts to save a
statute from vagueness through a narrow interpretation if plausible).
300
See supra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining the vagueness doctrine
and what is required in order for a statute to be in compliance with the Constitution).
301
See supra text accompanying notes 27, 114–116 (describing the CFAA as the
primary federal statute used to combat computer crime. A statute will be overbroad if its
sanctions apply to constitutionally protected activity.).
302
See supra note 152 (explaining how broad views terminate authorization based
on an employee’s intent regardless of subsequent actions).
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reach and sidestepping overbreadth concerns requires a narrow
interpretation.303
Allowing criminal liability to hinge on an employee’s subjective
intent at any given moment renders an agency-based interpretation of the
CFAA improperly overbroad by capturing hoards of legitimate behavior and
producing uncertain results.304 Agency interpretations of the CFAA
transform substantial amounts of innocent employee conduct into actionable
malfeasance by turning an employee’s subversive thought—however fleeting
or harmless—into a total termination of access.305 To the agency
interpretation’s logical conclusion, every employee giving notice spends her
last two weeks incurring potential civil and criminal liability each time she
accesses a computer.306 Sweeping so much plainly legitimate activity into a
criminal statute’s scope makes an agency-based interpretation of the CFAA
unconstitutionally overbroad.307
A contract-based interpretation of the CFAA is overbroad because it
allows private parties to determine criminal conduct and allows the
government to prosecute constitutionally protected behavior that is otherwise
non-punishable.308 Granting employers and service providers unilateral
power to construct agreements where breaches result in criminal and civil
liability encourages even broader underlying contracts.309 Determining
liability based on the mere breach of an agreement instead of analyzing the
validity of the underlying agreement elicits vagueness concerns, overbreadth

303
See supra text accompanying notes 228–229 (discussing how keeping the
CFAA constitutional requires a limiting interpretation).
304
See supra note 213–216 and accompanying text (explaining that holding a
misdemeanor as a violation of the CFAA is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague).
305
See supra text accompanying notes 234–235 (explaining that broad
interpretations transform the CFAA from a criminal hacking statute into an expansive
misappropriation statute).
306
See supra notes 234–237and accompanying text (illustrating how a broad
interpretation of the CFAA can capture lots of legitimate activity. An employee’s two-week
notice of termination, even though customary, is still adverse to the employer’s interest. Under
a broad, contact-based interpretation of the CFAA, the act of giving notice immediately
terminates the employee’s authorization. Even if the employee still has valid log-in
information and can access computer files, any access past the adverse act is without
authorization.).
307
See supra text accompanying notes 115, 161 (hinging authorization on an
employer’s subjective view of adverse to his interest increases the likelihood that much of an
employee’s subsequent legitimate behavior is also unauthorized).
308
See supra text accompanying notes 115, 209–212 (comparing government’s
inability to prohibit constitutionally protected behavior with an employer or service provider’s
ability to write any terms they desire).
309
See supra text accompanying notes 115, 209–212 (drafting contracts to provide
maximum protection for the employer encourages using broad and vague terms, can also
improperly restrict speech in violation of the First Amendment).
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concerns, and the potential to substantially infringe on constitutionally
protected behavior.310
Tying criminal liability to the terms of privately drafted agreements
runs a severe risk of curbing First Amendment freedoms.311 If an
employment contract prohibits employees from expressing pro-choice views,
an employee could be held criminally liable under a broad interpretation of
the CFAA for emailing a friend to express a pro-choice view—even if done
on his own time from a personal email account—if the email was sent from a
company computer.312 Individuals are free to commit to this type of contract
provision with other private parties.313 However, the government cannot use
the CFAA to indirectly prosecute behavior that it cannot directly punish.314
The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private contentbased speech; the government cannot make an end-run around the United
States Constitution by using an employee’s breach of a private contract to
punish the same constitutionally protected expression.315
Terms of service agreements containing the same type of provision
could severely impinge freedom of speech by restricting seemingly public
sites and inhibiting the free flow of information.316 Contract-based
interpretations of the CFAA impermissibly allow private parties to determine
criminal penalties, and allow the government to control otherwise
constitutionally protected behavior.317 The implications of a contract-based
interpretation of the CFAA are appallingly and unconstitutionally
overbroad.318

310

See supra notes 103, 186 (showing how the due process required for all
criminal statutes per the vagueness doctrine is not examined under a contract-based
interpretation of the CFAA).
311
See supra notes 115–117 (explaining that statutes are overbroad if they violate
a constitutionally protected right).
312
See supra text accompanying note 187 (breaching an employment agreement
under a contract-based interpretation of the CFAA renders an employee’s subsequent
computer access either without authorization or exceeding authorized access).
313
See supra notes 113–117, 213–216 and accompanying text (describing how
broad interpretations of the CFAA can infringe on constitutionally protected rights).
314
See supra text accompanying note 114 (explaining that statutes are overbroad if
sanctions apply to conduct that the government is not entitled to regulate).
315
See supra notes 113–117, 213–216 and accompanying text (describing how
broad interpretations of the CFAA can infringe on constitutionally protected rights).
316
See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining that statutes are
overbroad if they violate a constitutionally protected right).
317
See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining that statutes are
overbroad if sanctions apply to conduct that the government is not entitled to regulate). See
also text accompanying note 123 (proscribing criminal conduct falls to legislatures and not
private parties).
318
See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining that statutes are
overbroad if sanctions apply to conduct that the government is not entitled to regulate).
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The CFAA is already set up to capture millions of Americans who
use computers daily.319 A narrow interpretation of the CFAA is required in
order to keep the prohibited behavior limited to illegal activity and not in
violation of the overbreadth doctrine.320
C. Canons of Statutory Construction Require a Narrow Interpretation of
the CFAA
Broad interpretations of the CFAA run completely contrary to basic
canons of statutory construction that exist to help guide a court to Congress’s
intended purpose.321 Unsurprisingly, courts ignoring these canons to arrive at
a broadly interpreted result also ignore the CFAA’s intended purpose.322
Agency and contract-based interpretations veer inappropriately into
Congress’s stead of lawmaking by disregarding widely established canons
like the rule of lenity, the plain language rule, no mere surplusage, and the
canon of consistency to get to a desired result.323 In contrast, courts seeking
to effectuate the plain language of the CFAA in consonance with other
canons of statutory construction end up with a narrow interpretation.324
Recognizing that these statutory tools exist to help courts uncover the true
legislative intent, courts narrowly interpreting the CFAA stay faithful to
these canons.325 Sticking to these established statutory canons results in a
constitutionally sound, congressionally supported, narrow, interpretation of
the CFAA.326 Consequently, broad interpretations that thwart these
established canons are entirely incorrect.327

319
See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (describing that the CFAA’s
scope includes all computers).
320
See supra note 216 and accompanying text (concluding a narrow interpretation
is necessary in order to keep the CFAA from capturing unsuspecting and innocent behavior).
321
See supra Part II.A, text accompanying note 99, and Part IV.A–B (comparing
the purposes of the CFAA and canons of statutory construction with a broad interpretation).
322
See supra Part II.A, text accompanying note 99, and Part IV.A–B (comparing
the purposes of the CFAA and canons of statutory construction with a broad interpretation).
323
See infra Part V.C (explaining how broad interpretations of the CFAA
disregard canons of statutory construction and distort Congressional intent).
324
See supra Part II.A, Part III.C–F, and Part IV.C (comparing the purposes of the
CFAA and canons of statutory construction with a narrow interpretation).
325
See infra Part V.C (arguing that narrow interpretations faithfully follow
established canons of statutory constructions and lead to effectuating the actual intent behind
the CFAA).
326
See infra Part V.C (arguing that narrow interpretations faithfully follow
established canons of statutory constructions and lead to effectuating the actual intent behind
the CFAA).
327
See infra Part V.C (arguing that narrow interpretations faithfully follow
established canons of statutory constructions and lead to effectuating the actual intent behind
the CFAA).
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The Rule of Lenity Requires a Narrow Interpretation of the CFAA

The rule of lenity’s application to the CFAA is appropriate and
necessary.328 The constitutional requirement of fair notice coupled with the
divisive split in authority overwhelmingly satisfies the rule’s stringent
prerequisites.329 The CFAA’s primary use in civil contexts does not discount
the rule of lenity’s application; it is a criminal statute, and citizens are
required to have fair notice of criminal conduct.330 Furthermore, the CFAA’s
extreme ambiguity is evidenced by the disparate and inconsistent definitions
accorded to “authorization” across the three views.331 All three theories have
plunged headfirst into the CFAA’s legislative history and all have emerged
clutching selective excerpts to support their view.332 Even with the cautioned
use of the rule of lenity as one of last resort, its use is necessary to keep the
CFAA in alignment with constitutional standards.333
Applying the rule of lenity to the CFAA produces results consistent
with a narrow view.334 Resolving ambiguity in favor of the defendant
requires constraining the scope of the CFAA to only apply to conduct that is
clearly prohibited.335 A narrow interpretation accomplishes this by limiting
the CFAA’s scope to its commonly understood meaning.336 Broad
interpretations inappropriately breathe agency and contract law into the
CFAA when neither body of law is found in the statute’s plain language or
the legislative history.337 Additionally, the broad interpretations’ inherent

328

See supra note 125 and accompanying text (describing the rule of lenity’s use
as a canon of statutory construction as one of last resort; to be invoked only when there is
serious ambiguity in the statute).
329
See supra text accompanying notes 125–126, 150–156 (comparing the rule of
lenity’s prerequisites and the current split in authority over the definition of “authorization” in
the CFAA).
330
See supra text accompanying notes 27, 103 (describing the CFAA as primarily
a criminal statute, and explaining that all statutes with criminal applications are subject to the
vagueness doctrine).
331
See supra text accompanying notes 150–156 (describing the current circuit
court split over the definition of “authorization” in the CFAA).
332
See supra notes 175–176, 228–235 and accompanying text (comparing broad
interpretations supporting legislative history with narrow interpretation’s supporting
legislative history).
333
See supra text accompanying notes 125–126, 150–156 (comparing the rule of
lenity’s prerequisites and the current split in authority over the definition of “authorization” in
the CFAA).
334
See supra text accompanying note 237 (interpreting the CFAA narrowly and
consistently with the rule of lenity).
335
See supra text accompanying note 119 (applying the rule of lenity requires
choosing the interpretation most protective of the defendant to ensure sufficient notice).
336
See supra notes 217–219 and accompanying text (describing how a narrow
interpretation of the CFAA applies).
337
See supra notes 84, 152–154 and accompanying text (comparing the plain
language of the statute with overview of broad views’ application).
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lack of notice produces surprising and unexpected results.338 Employees who
understand “authorization” to mean permission would be surprised if
authorization terminated abruptly and without notice through agency or
contract law, especially if employees are still able to access company
accounts or accurately log into a company computer.339 Lastly, broad
interpretations of the CFAA incorrectly favor plaintiffs by allowing an
employer’s subjective motivation to dictate criminal and civil liability.340
When a statute like the CFAA produces such varying and
inconsistent results, the rule of lenity is required to make sure that due
process requirements are being met and that rulemaking stays in the
legislative sphere.341 The rule of lenity directs courts to choose a narrow
interpretation of the CFAA because out of the three interpretations currently
in play across jurisdictions, it is the one most protective of defendants.342
2.

The Plain Language of the CFAA Requires a Narrow
Interpretation

The plain language of the CFAA prohibits improper access to
information.343 A court tracking the plain language of the CFAA will limit
claims to those alleging improper access because that is as far as the statutory
language extends.344 A narrow interpretation follows the plain language rule
by correctly restricting the CFAA’s scope to its statutory language and
supplementing only undefined terms with commonly understood
meanings.345 Broad interpretations extend impermissibly beyond any plain
language interpretation of the CFAA by incorporating “purpose” or “use”
and subjective intent into a statute that deals objectively with access.346

338
See supra note 229 and accompanying text (explaining that employees would
be surprised if they were suddenly subject to criminal sanctions despite continued access to
company computers).
339
See supra note 128 (explaining that an employee breaching an employment
contract or terms of service agreement would not expect that breach to result in criminal
liability).
340
See supra notes 82, 152–154 and accompanying text (comparing the plain
language of the statute with overview of broad views’ application).
341
See supra notes 224–227 and accompanying text (describing why a narrow
interpretation stays true to the statutory language and is most protective of defendants).
342
See supra notes 227–229 and accompanying text (describing why a narrow
interpretation stays true to the statutory language and is most protective of defendants).
343
See supra note 82 (describing the CFAA).
344
See supra notes 82, 226 and accompanying text (explaining a plain language
definition of the CFAA).
345
See supra notes 139–142 and accompanying text (describing that Congress acts
purposefully in choosing words for statutes).
346
See supra note 11 (focusing on how an employee uses the accessed information
to determine liability).
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Broad interpretations construe the CFAA as if it reads “exceeds
authorized use” instead of “exceeds authorized access.”347 Agency and
contract-based interpretations examine the subsequent purpose and use for
the improperly accessed information instead of following the statute’s
directive and examining whether access was authorized.348 What an
employee does with the information taken from a computer is separate from
how an employee accessed the information in the computer and the CFAA
speaks only to the latter.349 Interpreting the CFAA according to the statute’s
plain language requires a narrow interpretation.350
Broad interpretations of the CFAA not only violate the letter of the
plain language rule by inserting extraneous words into the statute, they also
violate the spirit of the rule by directly contradicting Congressional intent.351
Congress originally included “use” in the statute but replaced it with
“exceeds authorized access” in the first round of amendments.352 Agency and
contract-based interpretations are incorrect because persistent incorporation
of “use” flagrantly returns the CFAA to a version Congress has expressly
revoked.353
With no definition of “without authorization” in the CFAA, the plain
language rule directs courts to define the term in accordance with its ordinary
meaning.354 Courts narrowly interpreting the CFAA follow this fundamental
rule and look to dictionaries and common usage to define “authorization” as
“permission or power granted by authority.”355 In the employment context,
an employer grants access by providing an employee with a user name and
password.356 Once an employee has this access, any subsequent improper
access would fall under the CFAA provision “exceeding authorized
access.”357 Only non-employees, employees without initial access, and
347

See supra text accompanying note 173 (basing liability on an employee’s
adverse intent).
348
See supra text accompanying note 173 (basing liability on an employee’s
adverse intent).
349
See supra notes 229, 233 (describing the difference between basing liability on
access or improper motive).
350
See supra text accompanying notes 27, 130–138 (comparing the language of
the CFAA to the plain language doctrine).
351
See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (describing why Congress
removed “use” from the CFAA in 1986).
352
See supra text accompanying note 59 (describing the language of the original
CFAA).
353
See supra note 60 (describing why Congress removed “use” from the CFAA in
1986).
354
See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text (directing a court to use an
ordinary, commonly understood meaning for an undefined statutory term).
355
See supra note 246 (summarizing how various courts have come to the same
definition of “authorization” under a narrow interpretation).
356
See supra text accompanying notes 217–219 (describing a narrow
interpretation of the CFAA).
357
See supra text accompanying note 240 (finding an employee with access
cannot be without authorization under the CFAA).
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employees with revoked authorization qualify as “without authorization”
under the CFAA.358 This narrow, straightforward reading of the CFAA
accurately and objectively focuses the inquiry on access.359
The plain language of the CFAA directs courts to objectively
analyze whether an employee’s access was authorized by framing the statute
in terms of “access.”360 Narrow interpretations undertake this objective
analysis in consonance with the plain language by focusing on the actions
taken by an employer to grant or deny access.361 Broad interpretations
instead embark on a subjective assessment of the employee’s intent.362 This
subjective analysis is completely unwarranted because the CFAA contains no
language suggesting that liability hinges on a breach of contract or
termination of an agency relationship.363 Broad interpretations predicating
liability on a subjective assessment of an employee’s subsequent use of
information are beyond the scope of the CFAA and contrary to its plain
language.364 While other obligations owed to an employer like company
policies, employment agreements, or fiduciary duties may prohibit misuse of
computer accessed information, the plain text of the CFAA does not.365
Broad interpretations violate the plain language of the CFAA by failing to
limit the statute’s scope to the statutory language.366
The statutory language of the CFAA expressly prohibits improper
access of computer information.367 This is precisely the definition and scope
under a narrow interpretation of the CFAA.368 Following the plain language
rule, narrow interpretations appropriately restrict the CFAA to claims
alleging improper access.369 Claims alleging misuse are correctly dismissed
358

See supra text accompanying notes 217–219 (describing a narrow
interpretation of the CFAA).
359
See supra text accompanying notes 217–219 (describing a narrow
interpretation of the CFAA).
360
See supra text accompanying note 219 (focusing liability on the affirmative
actions of an employer).
361
See supra text accompanying note 233 (failing to revoke an employee’s access
means they are not without authorization under the CFAA).
362
See supra text accompanying note 152 (focusing on the employee’s intent to
determine liability under broad interpretations of the CFAA).
363
See supra notes 27, 227 (illustrating the actions prohibited under the CFAA
and noting that nothing in the language indicates agency or contract law applies).
364
See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text (removing “use” as a basis for
liability in an early amendment).
365
See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text (limiting actions proscribed by
the statutes to unauthorized access or access that exceeds authorization).
366
See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text (limiting actions proscribed by
the statutes to unauthorized access or access that exceeds authorization).
367
See supra note 233 (determining the plain language meaning of the statutory
language).
368
See supra notes 225–227 and accompanying text (narrowly interpreting the
language so that it only applies to conduct clearly proscribed by the CFAA’s plain language).
369
See supra text accompanying notes 217–219 (describing a narrow
interpretation of the CFAA).
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under narrow interpretations since “use” is neither in the CFAA’s vernacular
nor part of the commonly understood definition of “authorization.”370
3.

The Canon “No Mere Surplusage” Requires a Narrow
Interpretation of the CFAA

The broad, agency-based interpretation of the CFAA violates the
canon of construction “no mere surplusage” by collapsing the distinction
between “without authorization” and “exceeding authorized access.”371
Applying the canon of no mere surplusage to the CFAA reminds courts that
Congress chooses statutory language purposefully and would not have
included both of the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized
access” in the CFAA if they simply meant the same thing.372 Any court
applying agency theory to the CFAA blatantly ignores the duty to effectuate
Congressional intent by rendering the term “exceeds authorized access”
superfluous.373 The agency-based interpretation’s clear violation of no mere
surplusage makes it an incorrect interpretation of the CFAA.374
A careful examination of the CFAA’s structure and its legislative
history reveals why an agency interpretation is so egregious.375 Quite simply,
the difference between unauthorized access and exceeding authorized access
matters.376 The terms were not meant as synonyms.377 Senate reports indicate
that Congress associated the term “without authorization” with outsiders, and
“exceeds unauthorized access” with insiders.378 The CFAA was structured
purposefully to reflect these two separate groups of violators: insiders and
outsiders are treated differently.379 Congress generally viewed insiders as less
culpable than outsiders and the various subsections and penalty schemes
370

See supra notes 225– 229 and accompanying text (narrowly interpreting the
language so that it only applies to conduct clearly by the CFAA’s plain language).
371
See supra text accompanying notes 139–140 (presuming Congress uses words
purposefully and courts should give effect to every word if possible).
372
See supra note 140 and accompanying text (assuming that because a statute
included both “uses” and “carries,” Congress intended each word to have a distinct meaning).
373
See supra note 228 (rejecting an agency approach because it renders part of the
statute meaningless).
374
See supra note 228 (rejecting an agency approach because it renders part of the
statute meaningless).
375
See supra Part II.A–B (targeting outsiders in the CFAA but also including
insiders in certain circumstances).
376
See supra notes 65–66 (explaining the purpose between having two separate
phrases in the CFAA).
377
See supra notes 65–66 (explaining the purpose between having two separate
phrases in the CFAA).
378
See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text (demonstrating Congress used the
term “without authorization” to apply to outsiders and the term “exceeds authorized access” to
apply to insiders with an existing level of authorization).
379
See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text (demonstrating Congress used
the term “without authorization” to apply to outsiders and the term “exceeds authorized
access” to apply to insiders with an existing level of authorization).
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reflect this sentiment.380 For example, an early amendment removed the term
“exceeds authorized access” from a subsection that previously contained
both terms because Congress wanted to limit applicability to outsiders.381
Congress’s conscientious use of two separate terms—each with its own
unique definition—demonstrates why any interpretation that transposes or
conflates the meaning of the two terms is incorrect.382
Agency theory eliminates any distinction between the terms “without
authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.”383 Terminating authorization
immediately upon any employee act that does not further the employer’s
interest defines “without authorization,” but renders “exceeds authorized
access” meaningless.384 The employee either has authorization when
accessing his employer’s computer system to further the company’s interests,
or he has no authorization upon acting adversely to his employer’s interest.385
The employee can never “exceed authorized access;” he is either authorized
or unauthorized.386 Eliminating an entire explicitly defined term indicates
that an agency-based interpretation of the CFAA is inappropriate.387
Beyond compressing two distinct statutory terms into one, agencybased interpretations completely invert Congress’s intent for outsiders to be
categorized as acting “without authorization” with insiders acting to “exceed[
] authorized access.”388 By terminating current employees’ authorization
upon adverse acts, agency-based interpretations of the CFAA hold that
current employees act “without authorization” instead of “exceeding

380
See supra note 65 (outlining the CFAA which imposes the most severe penalty
on a subsection that uses the term “without authorization” but not “exceeds authorized
access); see also note 32 (comparing subsections of the statute that include both terms
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” with subsections that only use the
term “without authorization”); see also note 226 (differentiating the terms “without
authorization” and “exceeds authorized use”).
381
See supra notes 66–67 (expressing concern that leaving insiders in this
subsection would expose them to liability for computer misuses which should not rise to the
level of criminal conduct).
382
See supra note 227 (explaining it is incorrect to interpret a statute in a way that
leaves part of the language in the statute meaningless).
383
See supra note 228 (rejecting an agency approach because it renders part of the
statute meaningless).
384
See supra text accompanying notes 173–174 (holding that the defendant, who
was an employee at the time of the alleged access, was “without authorization” after
terminating his agency relationship).
385
See supra text accompanying notes 162–164 (explaining how an employee is
either authorized or unauthorized under an agency-based interpretation of the CFAA).
386
See supra text accompanying notes 162–164 (explaining how an employee is
either authorized or unauthorized under an agency-based interpretation of the CFAA).
387
See supra text accompanying notes 139–142 (explaining that Congress chooses
statutory language carefully and any interpretation that ignores part of the statutory language
does not effectuate Congressional intent).
388
See supra notes 65–67, 173 (comparing Congressional intent in using two
separate terms for insiders and outsiders, with an agency-based interpretation which applies
the terms incorrectly).
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authorized access” which Congress intended for insiders.389 Similarly
contravening Congressional intent under a contract-based interpretation of
the CFAA, the First Circuit in Explorica held that a former employee
(outsider) had “exceeded authorized access” (Congress’s designated term for
insider) by accessing a public website.390 Agency courts for the most part
unabashedly ignore this canon of statutory construction, unconcerned with
the distorted CFAA they leave in their wake. Courts attempting to address
the canon of no mere surplusage under an agency-based interpretation the
CFAA have struggled to articulate any meaningful difference between the
two terms.391
An agency-based interpretation of the CFAA is incorrect because it
inverts Congressional intent and fails to distinguish between separate phrases
in the statute.392 On the other hand, a narrow interpretation of the CFAA
gives sensible and distinct constructions to “without authorization” and
“exceeds authorized access” in accordance with Congressional intent.393
Under a narrow interpretation, a person is “without authorization” only when
initial access is not permitted, and a person “exceed[s] authorized access”
when initial access is permitted, but the access of certain information is not
permitted.394 This narrow view gives each term a distinct meaning and
supports Congress’s intended application by applying “without
authorization” to outsiders and applying “exceeds authorized access” to
insiders.395
4.

The Canon of Consistency Requires a Narrow Interpretation of the
CFAA

Courts broadly interpreting the CFAA do not appear overly
concerned with the canon of consistency.396 However, ignoring this canon is
389

See supra note 173 and accompanying text (holding that once an employee acts
adversely to his employer, he is “without authorization” and leaving no situation where an
employee could ever “exceed authorized access” like Congress intended).
390
See supra text accompanying notes 193–194 (finding under a contract-based
interpretation that the employee had broken a confidentiality agreement by acting adversely to
the employer’s interests).
391
See supra text accompanying note 184 (admitting the difference was “paperthin” and using Explorica’s holding as evidence of the distinction in terms).
392
See supra notes 162–165 and accompanying text (holding an employee is
“without authorization” once they act adversely to their employer); see also notes 188–194
and accompanying text (applying a contract-based interpretation of the CFAA producing
results incongruent with Congressional intent).
393
See supra note 226 (explaining in differences in the two terms under a narrow
interpretation).
394
See supra note 226 (explaining in differences in the two terms under a narrow
interpretation).
395
See supra note 227 (rejecting the agency theory because it equates the two
terms contravening Congressional intent).
396
See supra Part V.A–B (describing how broad definitions fail to consider how
precedent will affect situations outside the one at issue).

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013

49

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 5

130

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

a grievous error when interpreting a statute like the CFAA.397 Congress
dictated that the same meaning should be applied throughout the statute by
providing one definition for “exceeds authorized access” and using the term
in multiple sections.398 Although the CFAA repeats the same terms
continuously, the elements for each subsection vary.399 Each subsection’s
unique elemental composition requires that courts use caution when
interpreting a term since that term’s definition will apply to the entire
statute.400
Courts broadly interpreting the CFAA in civil contexts are quick to
adopt definitions that work for the immediate case but could not translate
across subsections or to a criminal context without violating other
constitutional protections.401
A narrow interpretation of the CFAA is the only way for courts to
successfully apply consistent definitions across subsections and effectuate
Congressional intent.402 The Ninth Circuit recognized this in Nosal when it
rejected the government’s proposed broad definition of “exceeds authorized
access.”403 Although the definition was proposed for the fraud provision
charged in the case, the court correctly considered how the definition would
affect other subsections of the statute.404 Inserting the proposed meaning into
the broadest subsection of the CFAA containing the term “exceeds
authorized access,” (a subsection requiring only that a person who “exceeds
authorized access” obtain information from a protected computer), the court
wisely declined the government’s definition.405 Since obtaining information
397

See supra notes 32, 82–83 and accompanying text (describing Congress’s
repeated use of the same terms—i.e. “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized
access”—throughout the CFAA as well as noting the statute’s criminal and civil applications).
398
See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text (stating that identical words
and phrases within a statute should be given the same meaning).
399
See supra notes 65, 82–83 and accompanying text (describing the different
sections of the CFAA).
400
See supra notes 145–149 and accompanying text (illustrating why a court
should take care when interpreting statutes with criminal and civil applications).
401
See supra Part V.A–B (describing how broad definitions fail to consider how
precedent will affect situations outside the one at issue and are in violation of the void for
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines).
402
See supra notes 147–148 (describing how the mens rea requirements vary
within subsections of the CFAA).
403
See supra notes 148, 237–238 and accompanying text (applying the canon of
consistency to eliminate a proposed broad interpretation of the CFAA; deciding instead to
narrowly interpret “exceeds authorized access” to stay in compliance with the canon of
consistency).
404
See supra notes 148, 237–238 and accompanying text (applying the canon of
consistency to eliminate a proposed broad interpretation of the CFAA; deciding instead to
narrowly interpret “exceeds authorized access” to stay in compliance with the canon of
consistency).
405
See supra notes 82, 237–238 (finding § 1030(a)(2)(C) to be the broadest
subsection of the CFAA because it does not require any intent beyond intentionally
“exceed[ing] authorized access” to view information on a computer).
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from a protected computer translates into viewing any information on any
computer, the court correctly surmised that adopting the government’s
definition would impermissibly “transform whole categories of otherwise
innocuous behavior into federal crimes simply because a computer is
involved.”406
Broad interpretations of the CFAA cannot be applied consistently
without triggering constitutional concerns.407 Criminal statutes require due
process and applying restrictive, consistent, definitions to the CFAA is the
only way to ensure the statute is constitutional.408 In order to consistently
define “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” in civil and
criminal contexts and across subsections, a narrow interpretation of the
CFAA is required.409
D.

Broad Interpretations Defeat the Intended Scope of the CFAA

Broad views mistakenly cite to the CFAA’s expansive amendments
as proof that the statute was meant to apply widely.410 Broad views contend
that narrow interpretations ignore the consistent amendments that Congress
has enacted to broaden its application.411 This argument misinterprets the
statute’s amendments and overlooks the subject of the CFAA.412 While the
CFAA has undoubtedly broadened in scope, these expansions reflect
Congress’s effort to keep the CFAA relevant in the face of quickly evolving
technology; they are not an effort to subsume existing state laws.413
Congress knew even before 1984 that attempting to combat
computer crime with one statute would be an ongoing effort and one likely to
involve frequent amendments.414 The widely-criticized original version was
so narrowly drawn that it proved unusable.415 Although the first round of
406
See supra note 236 (explaining that the government’s proposed broad
definition of “exceeds authorized access” under the fraud section would make any violation of
a private agreement subject to criminal liability under the CFAA).
407
See supra note 237 (outlining various ways that a broad interpretation of the
CFAA raises constitutional concerns).
408
See supra note 228 (interpreting the CFAA narrowly results in consistent
definitions that meet the due process demanded from all criminal statutes).
409
See supra note 228 (interpreting the CFAA narrowly results in consistent
definitions that meet the due process demanded from all criminal statutes).
410
See supra note 176 and accompanying text (defending a broad interpretation of
the CFAA due to its expansive amendments).
411
See supra note 176 and accompanying text (defending a broad interpretation of
the CFAA due to its expansive amendments).
412
See supra notes 47, 81 (describing the purpose of the CFAA as one to combat
new types of computer crimes).
413
See supra note 81 (admitting that frequent amendments might be necessary in
order to keep the CFAA relevant).
414
See supra note 81 (admitting that frequent amendments might be necessary in
order to keep the CFAA relevant).
415
See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties
encountered in the original statute).
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amendments in 1986 was expansive, it was entirely remedial and necessary
to reset the CFAA’s bounds in order for the statute to achieve its designed
purpose.416 Expansive amendments were necessary to protect confidential
information in public and private sector computers and to make it an
effective tool against computer crime which is interstate in nature.417 Yet,
throughout all of the technical changes implemented over the years,
Congress has never once altered the CFAA’s purpose or narrow scope.418
The amendments only expand the CFAA’s application in order to keep it
relevant and applicable to new types of computer crimes, not to override
existing statutes.419
Congress deliberately did not preempt the field of computer crime
when the CFAA was originally enacted, and it continues to amend the statute
without exercising its preemption power.420 Not exercising its preemption
power is evidence of Congressional intent to preserve the narrow scope of
the CFAA.421 Even the most expansive amendments came with estimates
from the Departments of Justice and Treasury stating that the changes would
not result in any significant cost to the federal government.422 If Congress
meant for the vigorous application of the CFAA in employment contexts, the
estimates of costs incurred would not be negligible.423 Congress has not
wavered from its original intent to limit the CFAA to crimes involving a
compelling federal interest.424 Broad views fail to recognize that even
capturing just one federally compelling computer criminal would still require
an extremely broad reach.425

416
See supra Part II.C (amending the CFAA was necessary to make it an effective
tool to combat computer crimes).
417
See supra note 52 (expanding the CFAA’s scope to protect more financial
information).
418
See supra Part II.C (amending the CFAA was necessary to make it an effective
tool to combat computer crimes).
419
See supra Part II.C (amending the CFAA was necessary to make it an effective
tool to combat computer crimes).
420
See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (demanding that if Congress
intends to preempt or drastically alter the federal-state balance, it must speak clearly).
421
See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (presuming that Congress
meant to preserve the federal-state balance by not including a clear preemption provision in
the CFAA).
422
See supra note 81 (noting that Congress did not expect the introduction of the
civil provision to incur any significant costs to state or federal government).
423
See supra notes 29–30 (noting the surge in number of claims after the civil
provision was introduced).
424
See supra note 70 (limiting the scope of the CFAA to crimes involving a
compelling federal interest).
425
See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (noting the interstate nature of
computer crimes).
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The expansive reach of the Commerce Clause is necessary to
effectively combat the insidious, interstate nature of computer crime.426 An
expansive definition for “protected computer” reflects technological
advances that have rendered even the smallest devices capable of storing
large amounts of data.427 The civil provision was added to boost the deterrent
value of the statute and to allow private companies to recover for purposeful
damages.428 Despite all of the expansions, the narrative woven throughout
the legislative history is one of concern for potential damage to the nation’s
financial, educational, and scientific information at the hands of malicious
hackers or insidious viruses.429 Nowhere are those same concerns echoed for
employees who misappropriate data.430 Despite mountains of legislative
history to the contrary, broad interpretations continue to inaccurately equate
the inclusion of the Commerce Clause in the CFAA with a green light for an
expansive scope.431
Broad interpretations capture employee behavior that Congress
intended to keep outside the CFAA’s reach by welcoming disgruntled
employer claims.432 Although insiders have firmly been in the CFAA’s range
since its inception, Congress took steps to ensure that even objectionable
authorized employee actions would not be prosecuted under the CFAA
unless clearly criminal.433 Recognizing the potential gray-area for employees
with access to company computers, Congress raised the mens rea in an early
amendment to eliminate accidental access from the statute’s reach.434
Further, senate reports caution that employees who briefly exceed their
access should be subject to administrative rather than criminal
proceedings.435
426
See supra notes 47, 78 (describing the purpose of the CFAA was to effectively
combat serious computer misuse crimes and acknowledging those were mainly interstate in
nature).
427
See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text (noting the interstate nature of
computer crimes and always-evolving technology).
428
See supra text accompanying notes 71–74 (explaining why the civil provision
was added to the CFAA).
429
See supra notes 34–36 (discussing the types of computer crime targeted by the
CFAA).
430
See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (attempting to eliminate
misbehaving employees from the CFAA’s scope unless the behavior was clearly criminal).
431
See supra Parts II.C, II.E (justifying the expansive amendments as necessary in
order to keep the CFAA effective as a tool to combat compelling federal interest crimes of
serious compute misuse).
432
See supra note 49 (describing the difference in types of computer crimes).
433
See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (stating a preference for
administrative sanctions for employee misconduct instead of prosecution under the CFAA).
434
See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (eliminating insider liability for
accidental access).
435
See supra note 67 (deciding employees who briefly exceeded authorized use
should be subject to administrative sanctions rather than punished under the CFAA, especially
in situations where the computer is not clearly delineated to communicate which access is
prohibited).
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Congress meant to exclude the behavior now openly litigated under
agency and contract-based interpretations of the CFAA by taking steps to
avoid situations where employees could face liability for slight unauthorized
use.436 Broad interpretations allow liability to hang from even slight or
unknowing employee missteps if contrary to an employer’s interest or in
breach of a company policy.437 A brief lapse in diligence under an agency
interpretation or a slight breach of company policy under a contract
interpretation and an employer can haul an employee to federal court in
jurisdictions adopting broad views.438 The inherent uncertainties in these
broad, subjective views create the exact situation Congress did not want the
statute to cover.439 Accordingly, broad, subjective views are not correct
interpretations of the CFAA.440
Broad views also demolish the purpose of the CFAA by
misunderstanding the type of crime targeted by the statute and adjudicating
claims far outside the intended scope.441 A proper claim under the CFAA
features behavior that is criminal because it misuses a computer whereas
broad interpretations allow claims in which the computer merely facilitates a
traditional crime.442 Jurisdictions using a broad interpretation incorrectly
allow employers to haul employees into court for traditional state law crimes
labeled as a CFAA claim due to the incidental involvement of a computer.443
Emailing, downloading, or otherwise copying information to use in
competition with an employer is not the new, emerging computer crime the
CFAA was created to combat.444 The new, emerging type of crime that the
436

See supra note 67 (deciding employees who briefly exceeded authorized use
should be subject to administrative sanctions rather than punished under the CFAA, especially
in situations where the computer is not clearly delineated to communicate which access is
prohibited).
437
See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text (describing liability under
broad interpretations).
438
See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text (describing liability under
broad interpretations).
439
See supra note 67 (deciding employees who briefly exceeded authorized use
should be subject to administrative sanctions rather than punished under the CFAA, especially
in situations where the computer is not clearly delineated to communicate which access is
prohibited).
440
See supra note 67 (deciding employees who briefly exceeded authorized use
should be subject to administrative sanctions rather than punished under the CFAA, especially
in situations where the computer is not clearly delineated to communicate which access is
prohibited).
441
See supra Part II.A, text accompanying note 172 (comparing the type of crime
targeted under the CFAA with a broad interpretation’s holding of liability in misappropriation
claim).
442
See supra Part II.A and accompanying text (describing the different types of
computer crimes).
443
See supra note 237 (correctly dismissing a CFAA claim that should have been
filed in a state court).
444
See supra notes 36–47 (comparing actual crimes targeted by the CFAA to
traditional crimes already adequately covered by state laws addressing employee misconduct).
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CFAA was created to combat includes hacking, spreading viruses, and
intentionally incapacitating or compromising the functionality of a
computer.445 Misappropriation, unfair competition, tortious interference, and
breach of contract actions all existed well before the advent of computers and
remain actionable regardless of any computer involvement.446 Broad
interpretations allow claims that predate computers and misinterpret the level
of computer involvement needed to trigger a CFAA claim.447 Broad
interpretations are wrong because these are not the crimes Congress intended
for the CFAA.448
Broad views horrendously abuse the CFAA by penalizing a wide
swath of less-than-criminal behavior and adjudicating incorrect types of
crimes under a computer misuse statute targeted primarily at compelling
federal interest crimes.449 Simply by sticking to an objective analysis and the
statutory language, narrow interpretations correctly dismiss these
employment cases, allowing focus and resources to remain trained on the
real target of the CFAA: crimes of computer misuse.450 Even though narrow
interpretations require dismissing the kind of misappropriation claims
typically seen in agency or contract-based interpretations, employers are not
left without redress.451 Employers are simply forced to re-file in state court,
or back in federal court basing jurisdiction on complete diversity, where the
claims should have initially been filed.452 Broad interpretations are clearly
incorrect applications of the CFAA because they hijack federal judicial
resources and undermine traditional state powers by adjudicating
inappropriate claims.453
445

See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text (creating the CFAA in order to
effectively prosecute computer crimes that were not susceptible to prosecution under
traditional, existing criminal statutes).
446
See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text (comparing crimes targeted by
the CFAA and crimes traditionally governed by states).
447
See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text (comparing crimes targeted by
the CFAA and crimes traditionally governed by states).
448
See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text (creating the CFAA in order to
effectively prosecute computer crimes that were not susceptible to prosecution under
traditional, existing criminal statutes).
449
See supra notes 234–235 and accompanying text (interpreting the CFAA
narrowly in order to avoid criminalizing a wide range of innocent activity).
450
See supra notes 239–242 and accompanying text (describing a narrow
interpretation of the CFAA).
451
See supra notes 239–242 and accompanying text (describing that breaching an
employment agreement premised on misuse was an inappropriate CFAA claim since the
defendant was authorized to access the computer and that appropriate state law remedies were
still available).
452
See supra notes 239–242 and accompanying text (describing that breaching an
employment agreement premised on misuse was an inappropriate CFAA claim since the
defendant was authorized to access the computer and that appropriate state law remedies were
still available).
453
See supra text accompanying note 235 (interpreting the CFAA narrowly in
order to avoid criminalizing a wide range of innocent activity).
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Broad Interpretations of the CFAA Evoke Federalism Concerns

Broad interpretations far surpass the CFAA’s intended gap-filling
function by displacing large expanses of state laws.454 Without clear
congressional intent, courts should not interpret statutes in a way that
tremendously shifts the federal-state balance.455 Yet that is exactly what
courts broadly interpreting the CFAA do.456 Broad interpretations allow
employers to create federal jurisdiction for any dispute involving a
computer.457 Computers play increasingly prominent roles in society; if all it
takes to transpose an existing state action into a CFAA claim is the
involvement of a computer, a majority of state claims could soon be
extinct.458 Broad interpretations transform the CFAA into a universal federal
cause of action by allowing employers to completely bypass a wide berth of
state laws.459 This is an incorrect application of the CFAA because Congress
sought to balance the statute against existing remedies, not to completely
displace them. 460
Not only do broad interpretations of the CFAA usurp traditional state
powers, they disturb carefully constructed policy preferences and undermine
substantive law.461 For example, states’ policy-driven trade secret statutes
become meaningless when employers can label the same action a CFAA
claim and circumvent carefully constructed evidentiary burdens.462 Broad
interpretations allow employers to enlist the CFAA to protect information
that state trade secret law does not protect.463 This undermines deliberate

454

See supra text accompanying note 47 (describing the CFAA’s role as a gapfiller to be used when prosecution under existing statutes would be difficult due to computer
technology).
455
See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (requiring clear congressional
intent before a court’s interpretation of a statute alters established policy preferences).
456
See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (requiring clear congressional
intent before a court’s interpretation of a statute alters established policy preferences).
457
See supra note 172 and accompanying text (broadly interpreting the CFAA to
allow traditional state law claims like misappropriation, breach of contract, and theft of trade
secrets to be litigated in federal court).
458
See supra note 172 and accompanying text (broadly interpreting the CFAA to
allow traditional state law claims like misappropriation, breach of contract, and theft of trade
secrets to be litigated in federal court).
459
See supra note 237 (interpreting the CFAA broadly allows an otherwise state
law claim access to federal court if a computer is involved).
460
See supra Part II.D (detailing the intended scope of the CFAA).
461
See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (comparing the higher
evidentiary standards typically found in state trade secret statutes to a CFAA claim).
462
See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (comparing the higher
evidentiary standards typically found in state trade secret statutes to a CFAA claim).
463
See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (comparing the higher
evidentiary standards typically found in state trade secret statutes to a CFAA claim).
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policy goals and encourages employers to avoid seeking redress in state
courts.464
If Congress meant for federal law to provide redress for
misappropriation claims, it would have provided a civil cause of action in the
Economic Espionage Act (EEA) enacted in 1996.465 Congress’s
incorporation of traditional trade secret law requirements into the federal Act
suggests an appreciation and support for the policies driving trade secret law
and a desire to maintain traditional requirements.466 Not providing a private
cause of action suggests Congress affirmatively intended to not interfere with
or displace traditional state trade secret law.467 Moreover, it is evident that
the appropriate scope of the CFAA does not include these claims because
Congress does not enact duplicative statutes and the EEA covers
misappropriation claims.468
Courts narrowly interpreting the CFAA correctly deduce that absent
explicit congressional intent, the CFAA should not displace substantial
portions of state law.469 These courts do not say misbehaving employees are
never liable, just that they are not liable under the CFAA unless they abuse
access privileges.470 Courts using a narrow interpretation recognize the
CFAA’s intended scope and respectfully decline jurisdiction over claims that
fall outside of it.471 A narrow interpretation of the CFAA is the only way to
ensure that the statute does not eclipse large portions of state law.472
VI. CONCLUSION
The CFAA is a criminal statute intended to target new forms of
computer crimes when no other state or federal statutes apply.473 Its function
as an effective deterrent to internal and external hacking depends on its
constitutionality and consistent application. Under broad interpretations, the
464
See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (comparing the higher
evidentiary standards typically found in state trade secret statutes to a CFAA claim).
465
See supra note 90 (implementing the EEA in 1996 but providing no private
cause of action).
466
See supra note 90 (implementing the EEA in 1996 but providing no private
cause of action).
467
See supra note 90 (implementing the EEA in 1996 but providing no private
cause of action).
468
See supra note 144 and accompanying text (explaining if another statute would
apply, the one at issue should not).
469
See supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text (presuming Congress acts
interstitially and will not displace existing law without explicit intent).
470
See supra notes 234–236 and accompanying text (arguing a broad
interpretation of the CFAA would displace large amounts of existing state law).
471
See supra notes 234–236 and accompanying text (arguing a broad
interpretation of the CFAA would displace large amounts of existing state law).
472
See supra notes 234–236 and accompanying text (arguing a broad
interpretation of the CFAA would displace large amounts of existing state law).
473
See supra Part II (detailing the legislative purpose of the CFAA).
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CFAA’s fairly narrow purpose is distorted beyond recognition until it is
stripped of its intended function and its constitutionality.474 A narrow
interpretation of the CFAA is the only way the statute remains
constitutional.475
A narrow interpretation correctly prioritizes plain language and the
rule of lenity over reading agency or contract law into definitions.476
Following these canons of construction, a narrow interpretation of the CFAA
provides the predictability and notice that due process requires and that broad
interpretations lack.477 Utilizing canons of constructions and abiding by
established doctrines, a narrow interpretation effectuates Congressional
intent and avoids the harmful implications of broad interpretations like
criminalizing innocent behavior and displacing state laws. Until the Supreme
Court or Congress step in, courts must interpret the CFAA constitutionally
and in line with Congressional intent. The plethora of issues surrounding
broad interpretations makes a narrow interpretation of the CFAA the only
correct choice.

474

See infra Part V (explaining why broad interpretations of the CFAA are
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; how broad interpretations fail to effectuate
Congressional intent and incorrectly trample existing state laws).
475
See infra Part V.A–B (arguing that a narrow interpretation of the CFAA
remains constitutional by meeting due process requirements and limiting the statute’s scope to
only cover punishable conduct).
476
See infra Part V.C (arguing that only a narrow interpretation follows
established canons of construction and, in doing so, is able to accomplish Congress’s intended
purpose).
477
See infra Part V.A–B (arguing that a narrow interpretation of the CFAA
remains constitutional by meeting due process requirements and limiting the statute’s scope to
only cover punishable conduct).

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss1/5

58

